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I. INTRODUCTION
That the last several decades have seen an explosion of Americans' reliance
on imprisonment as a penal sanction is unquestioned.' So vast has this expansion
been that the term "mass incarceration" has entered scholarly vocabulary as a way
of describing this phenomenon.2 The sheer cost of maintaining this prison state
may indeed be making it buckle somewhat under the weight of the incarcerateds'
fiscal burden.' Yet, for now, the prison state survives.4 It may weaken, soften,
change a bit further, but it will not die unless we understand what makes it strong.
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I See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 7-8 (2010) ("[T]he United States
now boasts an incarceration rate that is six to ten times greater than that of other industrialized
nations-a development directly traceable to the [post-1982] drug war.") (citation omitted).
Continues Alexander: "The only country in the world that even comes close to the American rate of
incarceration is Russia, and no other country in the world incarcerates such an astonishing percentage
of its racial or ethnic minorities." Id at 8.
2 See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108
MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010); lan F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023 (2010); Jonathan Simon, Consuming
Obsessions: Housing, Homicide, and Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 165
(2010).
See Nancy Wolff, Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass
Incarceration in America, 33 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y, & L. 332, 337 (2008) (book review) ("One
possible way to reduce reflexive inhumanity . . . is by emphasizing self-interest-that is, by making
people aware of how much it costs to support mass incarceration (approximately $200 billion
annually)."). Wolff argues, however, that a more effective strategy would be to focus on the cost per
crime category, highlighting the dramatic incarceration costs for fairly minor crimes. See id. at 337-
38. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that bursting state budgets in a period of
recession have led some states to modestly soften their drug laws); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271,
1297 n.152, 1304 (2004) (optimistically concluding that it "appears that the financial cost of mass
incarceration to taxpayers is beginning to sway legislators toward curbing prison growth" and that
"the costs of mass incarceration might similarly place an outer limit on legislative determinations of
sentences, with a preference for noncarceral alternatives, especially for low-level drug offenses.").
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Numerous theories have, of course, been floated to explain why the prison
state was born and still thrives.6 Explanations range from the rise of modern
conservative politics' to the need of a fractured citizenry to build social solidarity
around a common scapegoat.8 I tend to believe that there are multiple causes of
the prison version of Leviathan's rising.9 Yet one cause supported by converging
sources of empirical data too often ignored is a form of democratic pathology,
specifically, the absence or ill health of populist deliberative democracy.
Populist deliberative democracy (PDD), briefly defined, has several
features.' 0 First, it involves all social groups widely in policymaking." It does not
4 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 9, 11, 14 (noting that "[flar from fading away, it appears
that prisons are here to stay[,]" especially given that "[t]here is no broad-based movement brewing to
end mass incarceration" and that the ill effects of mass imprisonment are substantial even if many
individual sentences become somewhat shorter).
See L6pez, supra note 2, at 1068-69 (arguing that mass incarceration's modem
manifestation as a major tool in perpetuating racial stratification is likely to slow or halt reform of the
carceral trends of the past few decades).
6 See, e.g., JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?: THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY FROM
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN 2, 104-07 (2010) (arguing that the politicization of
criminal justice policymaking, a growing free market philosophy favoring de-regulation of financial
crimes but racially-biased enhanced regulation of minority street crimes, and the collapse of an
American economy generating a reasonably equal distribution of wealth combined to foster mass
incarceration's rise); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4-5, 7 (2007) (arguing that
mass incarceration has taken on a life of its own as it has become a model for solving a wide array of
social problems and organized methods of governance-affecting how government handles welfare,
education, immigration, and a host of other matters while creating powerful interest groups vested in
mass incarceration's continuing rule).
See L6pez, supra note 2, at 1031-36 (summarizing the theory that mass incarceration arose
as a conservative counter-punch against the successes of the mid-twentieth century's civil rights
movement).
See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 832 (2000).
9 ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 2-3 (rooting mass incarceration's rise in a search for
replacing the Jim Crow system of racial control); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 830-31 (viewing mass
incarceration and harsh criminal justice system penalties more generally as serving symbolic unity
among an increasingly diverse and morally divided American public); Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to
the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 235, 237 (2009) (partially attributing mass incarceration's continued existence to
policy and advocacy failures, particularly concerning the availability of effective alternatives to
imprisonment).
10 The term "populist deliberative democracy" here is mine, but its features are similar to
those described by many commentators as essential to the success of deliberative democracy schemes
more generally. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the
Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 271, 276-96 (2006) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Deliberation] (discussing the nature, structural features, and benefits of deliberative democracy
generally). The particular way in which I phrase those features here tracks how they play out in the
particular context of mass incarceration in the pages to follow.
134 [Vol 9: 1
2011] THE CRIMINAL REPUBLIC 135
reject representative decision-making, but representatives act only after receiving
widespread and diverse input from individuals and social groups.12  Second, it
provides such diverse persons and groups ample opportunity for effective voices in
deliberative fora; that is, voices in relatively small venues offering opportunities
for informed discussion with the real prospect of such discussion at least
sometimes altering policy outcomes.13  Third, all this activity occurs in an
expectation of compromise rather than domination.14  Citizens and groups
practiced in realizing this spirit understand its mutual benefits and develop the
skills necessary to achieve them.'5 Fourth, political activity aims at inclusion, not
exclusion, requiring a strong commitment to individual liberties.' 6  Fifth, and
finally, the deliberative, inclusive spirit knows no exceptions, requiring, for
example, even convicted offenders to have some voice in their fate.'7
1 See id. at 276 ("For deliberation to be democratic, it must be inclusive, using an expansive
definition of who is part of the process, that is, of who has the right to deliberate--or at least a voice
in choosing the deliberators-and of who is included in the group to whom deliberators owe their
justifications."). See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
3-4, 8-9 (2004) (making a similar point).
12 See ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2-3,
35-40 (2003). Bennett distinguishes his approach from "deliberative" ones because he is more
concerned with the benefits of political conversation than with whether it achieves viable outcomes.
See id. at 2. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, is "usefully defined as a system of political
communication of publicly-stated reasons for proposed collective outcomes, culminating in common
action." Taslitz, Deliberation, supra note 10, at 276. In all other respects, however, Bennett's theory
shares the goals of deliberative ones and usefully informs them. See also id. at 277 ("Most
deliberative theorists also recognize that resource constraints, such as limited time and money, often
require selecting representatives to deliberate on our behalf.").
13 See ANDREw E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 138-39 (1999)
[hereinafter TASLITZ, CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM] (explaining "effective" voice); Taslitz,
Deliberation, supra note 10, at 277 ("[M]any thinkers favor encouraging deliberation among smaller,
more local populations where greater participatory deliberation may be feasible.").
14 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 3-5; Taslitz, Deliberation, supra note 10, at
277 (noting that one characteristic of a deliberative democratic process is that it involves "reason-
giving among free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.").
15 See infra text accompanying notes 96-108.
16 Deliberative theorists differ on whether a deliberative process is sufficient or whether
substantive constraints on that process's outcome are also necessary. See Taslitz, Deliberation, supra
note 10, at 277-78. Here I side with writers favoring substantive constraints. Those writers fall into
two camps. Camp 1 argues that some outcomes, "such as enslaving certain classes of human beings,
are inconsistent with the very idea of reason-giving communication among equals." Id. at 278.
Camp 2 sees substantive constraints as inherent in the very nature of deliberation. Id. "For example,
without free speech, there cannot, by definition, be open reciprocal communication, and without
freedom of religion, certain views will inappropriately simply be taken off the table." Id. One major
function of a constitution is to delineate these substantive constraints. See infra text accompanying
notes 96-108 (elaborating on the importance of inclusion).
17 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 10 (2006) (analyzing the causes and consequences for American democracy
of denying felons and ex-felons the right to vote); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY
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This definition, of course, portrays an ideal type.' 8 Real social institutions
will display these features in degrees, not dichotomies. 9 But the "ideal" here is a
practical one, its features' value in reducing state punitiveness having been shown
in various studies.20 Where it is most closely realized, publics will likely seek
shorter and less frequent periods of imprisonment, alternatives to incarceration,
and an embrace of rehabilitation as one important goal of criminal punishment.21
But this sort of democracy itself should also reduce crime by enhancing state
legitimacy and citizen respect for law and heightening the overall level and
equality of distribution of that ever-elusive idea of human happiness.22 Happiness,
it turns out, is anti-criminogenic. 23
This paper looks at converging sources of evidence for this thesis. Thus, the
paper begins in Part II.A by examining studies of inter-state variation in
punitiveness, variation closely linked to the strength of PDD institutions and
culture. Next, in Part II.B, the paper explores comparative national data,
concluding that countries with higher levels of important aspects of PDD have
lower incarceration rates than countries like the United States that are influenced
more by raw populism than the deliberative kind. Paradoxically, PDD-like
processes seem to lead to greater deference to criminal justice experts because
criminal justice policies become less politicized. Those experts in turn tend to
favor alternatives to incarceration.
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND MODERN
CONSEQUENCES 4-5 (2005) (making a similar point).
18 See Dhananjai Shivakumar, The Pure Theory as Ideal Type: Defending Kelsen on the Basis
of Weberian Methodology, 105 YALE L.J. 1383, 1399 (1996) ("Ideal types are theoretical constructs
that model certain aspects of social reality and help us to explain particular historical conditions. For
example, 'perfect competition' is an ideal type that models a process of human behavior under
explicit assumptions that actually hold true in no historical society.") (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, "the comparison of an actual group of sellers and buyers within this model yields
significant insight into how the varying levels of information in the markets.. .may affect behavior."
Id
19 See Cass E. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1018-20 (2005); Taslitz, Deliberation, supra note 10, at 277
("Deliberative democracy is not an either/or affair, but rather a spectrum of institutions, some of
which may themselves involve little deliberation but which, as a whole, promote deliberative
ideals.") (footnotes omitted). Among the justifications for deliberative democracy are enhancing
governmental legitimacy, promoting public spiritedness, unifying diverse social groups into a
"People," and promoting public scrutiny and error correction. See id at 279-84. Poorly designed or
implemented deliberative institutions can, however, fail to achieve, or can even undermine, these
goals. See id. at 310-13 (cataloguing the cognitive dangers of poorly-created or executed
deliberative mechanisms). Fairly precise and detailed technical precautions are thus required for
deliberative democracy to achieve its promise. See id. at 313-15.
20 See infra Part H1.
2 See id.
22 id.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 383-412.
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Part II.C examines the likely effect of more deliberative, inclusive criminal
justice policymaking by incorporating the voices of the group most harmed by
crime: the victims of crime in poor, urban, racial-minority communities. Those
victims tend to favor broader social reforms to prevent crime in the first place and
more rehabilitative than retributive responses when crime does occur.
Part II.D examines "democratic social science": the use of social science
mechanisms that either mimic PDD or achieve some of its benefits. Incorporating
such social science in current policymaking processes, with some modifications to
increase the political salience of that social science, should also moderate
excessive retributivism, which is oft ill-informed.
Part II.E explores empirical data on what enhances individual and group
happiness, finding that PDD practices increase happiness, thereby decreasing both
crime itself and the punitive public spirit.
Part III, the conclusion, steps back to synthesize the more specific points
made in this paper. No single paper can "prove" that PDD would soften national
impulses toward mass incarceration. I argue, however, that I have at least made a
plausible case that this may be so, meriting further research. I also claim that this
study of the PDD-carceral connection teaches several lessons for softening
criminal justice policy in positive ways.
First, more informed decisions will be better ones. That requires some
deference to criminal justice experts. But encouraging such deference
simultaneously requires better educating the public. "Teaching" is useless,
however, unless students are attentive and open-minded. Deliberative mechanisms
that engage the public with the specifics of concrete cases and compel them to
engage with people outside their social sphere and ideas outside their political one
help to encourage such attentiveness and open-mindedness. Indeed, such
mechanisms better enable ordinary persons to draw on their own justice instincts in
a more effective, informed way. Unfortunately, these mechanisms require small-
group contact, making them hard to implement on a widespread basis.
Second, any mechanism that encourages greater empathy for other groups will
moderate carceral impulses. Again, such empathy requires prolonged, increased
contact with members of such groups in shared tasks. Such contact is likewise
hard to foster society-wide.
Ultimately, therefore, reformers should encourage any empathy-promoting,
accurate information-expanding, and particularly inclusive deliberative efforts in
connection with criminal justice. That may lead to small victories and gradual
improvement in currently harsh carceral policies. More likely, however, if the
thesis suggested here is correct, more fundamental changes in America's political
system to move away from raw populism toward more deliberative populism will
be necessary. I can see no such changes on the horizon. Absent unexpected
shocks to the political system, therefore, I see an immediate future of, at best,
modest improvement in a bleak carceral justice polity.
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II. EVIDENCE OF THE VIRTUES OF PDD IN RESTRAINING HARSH CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM POLICIES
Evidence of the virtues of PDD in reducing mass incarceration comes from
converging sources of data, including respectively comparative interstate data,
comparative international data, comparative intrastate data, democratic social
science, and happiness studies.
A. Comparative Interstate Data
Political scientist Vanessa Barker recently published one of the first studies
seeking to answer this question: Why do states vary in their degree of reliance on
mass incarceration? 24  Barker ignored outlier states-those that were
extraordinarily harsh or mild-selecting three states that she saw as representative
of three major American approaches to mass incarceration: California, New York,
and Washington State.25 Barker found that the more decentralized the decision-
24 VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 4-8 (2009).
25 See id. at 10-11, 15-18. Race, of course, always plays a role in the American story of mass
incarceration, but it cannot alone explain differences in incarceration rates. See id. at 18-19. "Racial
politics rather than racial demographics shape imprisonment patterns and are likely to vary by
political context." Id at 18. For example, New York has nearly twice the African-American
population of California yet a far more moderate imprisonment regime. See id. at 18-19. This
difference partly results from New York's relatively greater effectiveness in incorporating Blacks
into its political system, unlike the more racially-polarized politics of California. See id. Nor does
Washington State's low absolute and low proportionate Black population alone explain why that state
opted for penal de-escalation when facing high crime and a rapidly-growing Black population in the
1960s. See id. at 18. Some theorists indeed argue that a large or growing Black population triggers a
sense of majority White racial threat, resulting in high imprisonment rates to restrict the "menace"
and maintain social distance from it. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, 3 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 95,
95, 120-21 (2001). Washington (growing Black population) and New York (large absolute and
proportionate Black population) do not fit this model. See Loic Wacquant, The New "Peculiar
Institution": On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377, 377 (2000)
(arguing that the perceived mid-twentieth century failure of urban ghettos to adequately contain a
growing Black working class led to racially-skewed prisons to serve the same goals as the ghetto:
stigmatization, constraint, confinement, and institutional-encasement of a racially-tainted class). See
BARKER, supra note 24, at 18. Other theorists argue that when the Black population exceeds a certain
level, its sheer size gives that population sufficient political clout, leading to lower or less racially-
disparate incarceration rates. See Bradley Keen & David Jacobs, Racial Threat, Partisan Politics,
and Racial Disparities in Prison Admissions: A Panel Analysis, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 209, 215 (2009).
That may help to explain New York's relative carceral moderation but not California's harshness in
light of its still substantial Black population. Furthermore, the Black size tipping-point theory still
turns on its role in involving Blacks in a more-inclusive political process. That intermediate step of
inclusiveness-an element of PDD-would seem to be important, and local political cultures may
affect the success with which inclusiveness is achieved. See BARKER, supra note 24, at 18-19. It is
also worth noting that, while a greater degree of PDD in law-creation should contribute to lower rates
of mass incarceration, that is not alone sufficient to prevent racial disparities in the criminal justice
system. See TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, RESEARCH WORKING GROUP,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RACE AND WASHINGTON'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-28 (2011)
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making process, and the higher the degrees of collective agency, the lower the
reliance on mass incarceration will be.26 "Decentralization" means that there are
structurally many easy points of access to decision-making processes by
individuals and groups seeking social change. 27 "Collective agency" measures the
degree to which ordinary people are in fact mobilized into the policy making
process in a deliberative fashion.28 High scores on both measures are required to
reduce mass incarceration.29
(documenting such disparities). This is partly so because of implicit or unconscious racial biases.
See id. at 30-36.
26 See id at 36-46. Barker's study focuses on imprisonment, not on non-incarcerative penal
sanctioning. See id. at 14-15. Although non-incarcerative alternatives can help to enlighten
understanding mass incarceration, it is incarceration (in Barker's words, "imprisonment") that is the
topic of the current symposium. Id Barker herself focuses on imprisonment for several reasons: (1)
all states use it; (2) it is the "most intrusive and tactile [of] displays of state power"; (3) it is a "raw
and physical form of power that can subdue the minds and bodies within its grasp, especially as it
infringes on a person's sense of autonomy and selfhood"; and (4) it "captures something meaningful
about the relationship between rulers and ruled in democratic societies," namely "the extent to which
individual rights and autonomy are valued and protected from abuses of governmental power and
from the intolerance of the majority." Id. at 14-15.
27 See id at 37. Barker speaks of the importance of the extent to which there is a high degree
of "centralization" of political structures. See id at 36-37. I find it easier to use the term
"decentralization" to describe greater access to the levers of power rather than "centralization" to
describe degrees of limited access.
28 See id. at 40-41. More specifically, Barker defines high collective agency as high degrees
of "civic engagement and social capital." Id. at 41. The idea of "social capital" is drawn from Robert
Putnam's work. See ROBERT PUTNAM & RAFELLA Y. NANETTI, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITiONs IN MODERN ITALY 167-71 (1994). The term social capital "capture[s] how well people
connect and cooperate with one another through civic engagement in order to bring about common
goods." BARKER, supra note 24, at 40 (footnotes omitted). People in societies with high social
capital "tend to be active in politics and community life, creating both dense and loose networks of
social ties that can then increase cooperation, social cohesion, and mutual trust." Id. Barker starts
her study by declaring that where "people share a sense of civic duty, responsibility for self-
governance, and social connectedness, they may be less willing to inflict on one another the violence
of penal sanctioning." Id. at 41. On the other hand, low degrees of civic engagement combined with
high degrees of social polarization, says Barker, likely means that "polity members' antipathy toward
one another, especially toward marginalized social groups, such as criminal offenders, can easily be
expressed through penal sanctioning without much concern for the social reintegration of offenders."
Id.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 30-60 (explaining why one state with high
decentralization but low collective efficacy nevertheless demonstrated high rates of mass
incarceration). Barker recognizes that some will find her argument-that more democracy, at least of
a certain type, leads to lower levels of incarceration-counter-intuitive. See BARKER, supra note 24,
at 172, 176. For the reasons to follow, I find Barker's counterintuitive conclusions persuasive and
enlightening. Differences in crime rates do not, it should be noted, suffice to explain differences in
penalty. See id. at 16. Some states with relatively high crime rates have relatively low rates of
imprisonment. See id. Political differences play a far more important role. See id at 16-17.
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1. California
California's system of governance, for example, is highly decentralized.30
Propositions, initiatives, petitions, and other mechanisms enable, in theory, anyone
to propose changes in the law, permitting the people to vote directly on their fate.3 1
But California is woefully short on collective agency, particularly when it comes to
crime.32 The proposition and related processes are indeed generally captured by
relatively powerful social groups.33 Moreover, these groups then control a large
degree of the public debate, using it to foster a culture viewing crime as resulting
from individual moral failings and social indecency.34 This approach polarizes
society, pitting more powerful against less powerful social groups and fanning
retributive flames.33 The result is that California is by far the harshest of the three
states that Barker studied.36
The proposition process at first blush seems to embrace an ideal of
widespread citizen participation. But a proposition either survives or fails.
Compromise is not possible. The winner takes all. Perhaps negotiation could, in
theory, be possible in the crafting of the initial proposition. This does not occur,
however, because affluent whites dominate the political process in an otherwise
30 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 19-21, 43.
31 See generally JOE MATTHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: How REFORM BROKE
THE GOLDEN STATE AND How WE CAN Fix IT (2010) (discussing the history, flaws, and ill
consequences for democracy of the initiative and related California governance processes).
32 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 10 (arguing that high social polarization in California results
in a "depressed sense of mutual obligation and heightened contentiousness and uncompromising,
winner-take-all politics" in which "citizens tend to support and often demand that state elites pursue a
more retributive penal regime"). Id at 43 ("[F]ew people [in California] turn out to vote or
participate in local affairs.").
13 See id. at 50-51.
3 See id. at 10 ("[K]ey actors such as the governor, state officials, and social activists are
more likely to view crime as a result of moral depravity, individual failing, and social indecency."),
43 (noting California politics is "dominated by... a relatively small pool of the population"). This
retributive regime also "changed the moral calculus of justice in the state, dramatizing the pain and
suffering of crime victims as the justification for increased sanctions." Id at 10--11.
3 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 43 (noting that California's political configuration,
especially via the initiative process, has led "to more coercive social controls as a disconnected and
divided polity readily calls on the state's power to punish to solve complex policy problems,
especially those involving socially marginalized groups such as criminal offenders and racial
minorities").
36 See infra text accompanying notes 37-144.
3 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 43 ("California is an open polity, meaning that ordinary
people and grassroots movements can [in theory] influence the policy-making process through
multiple access points."); MATTHEWS & PAUL, supra note 31, at 10-11, 170-71.
3 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 43.
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racially and class-diverse state.39  Overall levels of voting, participation in local
affairs, and other kinds of civic participation are also low. 40
The result is that the skill of compromise with ideological opponents is
undeveloped, social norms of reciprocity weak.4' Moreover, neither the formal
democratic process nor the state's political culture require input from diverse civic
groups and individual citizens before propositions and their cousins hit the voting
machines.42 Reliance on propositions and initiatives also frees individual
politicians from accountability for the outcome because no politician authored the
legislation or was necessarily involved heavily in its passage or failure.43 Once
propositions are proposed, the only option left to both sides is mutual warfare."
Affluent whites usually win.45
California's system is thus, at best, one of agonistic populism, a means of
non-violent warfare. At its worst, it is populism for well-off whites, empowering
them in practice to exercise greater dominion over marginalized racial and class
groups. 46 These are precisely the groups most victimized by both crime and its
punishment and who, given limited time and financial resources, historically have
the most difficulty in making their voices heard in public fora.4 How California's
political culture came to be what it is today is a complex story carefully traced by
Barker, a task that she ably repeats to explain the rise of New York and
Washington's very different political cultures.48 What matters for my purposes
here is not to re-tell those tales in any detail but to discuss a few selected high
points and where they leave us today.
3 See id. ("Initially created to undercut corrupt politicians and express distrust of state elites,
the initiative process has also been used to legislate intolerance toward minority racial and ethnic
groups since its inception.").
40 See id. at 42, 49-51.
41 See id. at 43, 50. For a concise analysis of the importance of the role of reciprocity in
social affairs, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Reciprocity and the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 41
STETSON L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
42 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 43.
43 See id
4 The result of such warfare in the area of criminal justice is the weakening of social trust and
solidarity among social groups. Id. at 19, 50-51, 83-84 (arguing that this warfare intensifies the
majority's use of repressive state power to resolve social conflict in its favor while excluding
minorities from equal citizenship in practice).
45 See supra notes 35, 39 and accompanying text.
46 This sort of raw populism, different from the more deliberative kind that I advocate here,
succeeded in replacing California's earlier reparative criminal justice philosophy with a retributive
one favoring the infliction of pain on offenders. See id.; BARKER, supra note 24, at 43-83 (tracing
this history).
4 See infra Part II.C.
48 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 47-84 (California), 85-124 (Washington), 125-69 (New
York).
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The rising crime rate of the 1960s in this environment led to then-Governor
Reagan's embrace of harsh penal sanctions as a solution.4 9 Reagan portrayed his
effort as a campaign to protect victims against brutality.50 This passionate,
emotive embrace of victims against their supposed assailants became the trope
governing later criminal justice reforms bubbling up via the initiative and similar
processes.5 1  The eventual results extended through the years well beyond
Reagan's time as Governor and included passage of the Three Strikes
Proposition,52 the Victims' Bill of Rights Proposition,5 3 and the Crime Victims'
Justice Reform Act Proposition,54 all aimed at ever-harsher incarcerative policies.55
This Reaganite retributive criminal justice philosophy proved politically
advantageous to later politicians, leading it to play a continuing role in criminal
justice "reforms" in California, likely doing so still.56
Recent California reforms, prompted in part by the escalating cost of
incarceration, have been touted as marking a turn toward rehabilitation over
retribution.5 ' Rhetorically, however, the major reform so touted, the 2007 Prison
Reform Act (PRA), again emphasized public safety and crime victims, not
offenders' rights or place in the polity, as the sole justifications for a renewed
rehabilitative emphasis.5 8 Moreover, the PRA's main program is to expand prison
49 See id at 47-49, 58-60, 62-67, 83, 101, 127; HAGAN, supra note 6, at 28-29, 137-67
(revealing how Reagan's views on crime as California Governor were later reflected during his time
as America's President).
5o See BARKER, supra note 24, at 65 (noting that Reagan "thoroughly intertwined crime, civil
disorder, and race riots as a collective threat to democratic order"), 47-48, 67-68 (noting that the
Reagan-Deukmejian "penalty package" increased penal sanctions for seriously violent crimes, linking
the pain and suffering of victims to the need for change), 62, 127 (Reagan's view was that offenders
are punished to avenge victims).
s See id. at 47-49.
52 Three Strikes and You Are Out, Proposition 184, Cal. Gen. Assemb., Sess. 1993-1994 (Cal.
1994); see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINs & SAM KAMIN, PUNIsHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 1-14 (2001) (analyzing the history and social and
political consequences of California's Three Strikes legislation).
Victims' Bill of Rights, Proposition 8, Cal. Gen. Assemb., Sess. 1993-1994 (Cal. 1982).
54 Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Proposition 115, Cal. Gen. Assemb., Sess. 1993-1994
(Cal. 1990).
s5 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 47-49. The psychological reasons behind this harshness,
Barker explained, were these: "Populism helped Californians make sense of the complex social
changes associated with late modernity, translating rising crime, unruly youth culture, and racial
unrest as signs of moral depravity necessitating strict discipline and authoritarian response." Id. at
49.
56 See id. at 47-49, 66-84.
" See id at 78-79, 80. But see Hadar Aviram, Humonetarianism: The New Correctional
Discourse of Scarcity, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POvERTY L.J. 1, 47-52 (2010) (expressing cautious
optimism about cost-based concerns prompting future California reforms but conceding massive
obstacles to real, long-term improvements whose realization "remains to be seen").
58 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 81 (arguing that California's recent purported increased
emphasis on rehabilitation, especially in the PRA, was not "an indicator of deep-seated change"), 81-
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capacity, pressure from the courts to alleviate over-crowding being a prime causal
factor in the PRA's passage.59 Building more prisons is hardly a turn away from
mass incarcerationW California stands as a powerful example of how raw,
unmediated populism-as opposed to the deliberative kind favored here--can
result in extraordinarily harsh incarcerative policies heedless of social cost and
proportionate justice.
2. New York
New York, occupying the middle rung of the harshness ladder, is decidedly
not a populist state.6 1  Its political system is highly centralized and
bureaucratized.62 Initiatives, propositions, and referenda are not options.
Individuals and groups seeking to affect policy must navigate complex
bureaucratic procedures. Policy problems are viewed in technical rather than
populist terms. 4  Governmental processes, even the budgetary process, are
83 (explaining the failure in California, just three years before passage of the PRA, of Proposition 66,
which aimed to soften the Three Strikes Law but was soundly rejected by the electorate because of
populist appeals to the fear of crime). These results occurred despite earlier polls showing strong
public support for the measure. See California Field Poll, Release #2141, FIELD RES. CORP., Oct. 13,
2004, at 2.
s9 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 80-81; Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., Gov.
Schwarzenegger Signs Historic Bipartisan Agreement, Takes Important Step Toward Solving
California's Prison Overcrowding Crisis, (May 2, 2007), available at
http://www.cdce.ca.gov/News/2007_Press_Releases/Press2007O5O3.html.
6 Barker concludes,
[P]roposition 66's failure indicates the strength and persistence of California's populist
political traditions and the longevity of its retributive penal regime rather than the
emergency of a sustainable reform movement. Today, California's imprisonment rate
continues to climb, hovering above the national average despite a brief period of decline
between 1999 and 2002.
BARKER, supra note 24, at 83. In Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), the Court affirmed a three-
judge district court order to reduce overcrowding in California's state prison system to prevent
continuing violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. But
that holding does not likely mean that California will therefore abandon mass incarceration. To the
contrary, on June 8, 2011, California prison officials unveiled a plan to comply with the Brown
holding. That plan has three parts: (1) transferring some inmates to out-of-state prisons; (2)
"[b]uilding new prisons, health care, and mental health facilities and converting juvenile detention
centers to adult facilities"; and (3) shifting low-level, non-violent offenders to county jails. See
California Presents Long-Overdue Plan to Reduce Prison Overcrowding, WHAT TH4E FOLLY (June 8,
2011), http://www.whatthefolly.com/2011/06/08/us-news-california-presents-plan-to-reduce-prison-
overcrowding (last visited June 28, 2011). This plan hardly constitutes a massive reorientation
toward alternatives to incarceration.
61 BARKER, supra note 24, at 128.
62 See id. at 128-29.
6 See id. at 136.
6 See id. at 45-46, 126-29.
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notoriously opaque. 5 Where input is needed on special problems, New York's
elites turn to expert commissions, rather than broad-based citizen participation.
Elites operate relatively free of public debate, often caught up in cronyism,
patronage politics, and internal power struggles.
This intense centralization again limits citizen experience in cross-group
compromise and coalition-building outside elite hangers-on. Public participation
in governing is so low that New York has recently been placed under court order to
improve voter participation.
In this highly centralized environment of low collective efficacy, the state
maintains its legitimacy in two ways: first, by portraying itself as encouraging
policy in the name of the public good rather than merely fostering the individual
pursuit of self-interest; second, by proving to be effective in providing essential
public goods.o The latter tactic portrays the state as having and using technical
expertise to solve common problems.7 ' The most basic function of a state, of
course, is public safety.72 New York State, therefore, rather than waging war on
behalf of victims, waged war on crime as a disease needing specialized knowledge
and skills to eradicate it.73 The state's need to constantly prove its effectiveness
6s See id. at 134-37.
66 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 140-41.
67 See id at 128-31.
68 Barker elaborates:
New York does not allow for direct democracy, which limits public participation to
voting for representatives and further concentrates power among elites. Because
centralization routinely blocks citizens' access to elites and other key decision makers,
citizens may become quiescent. Because their demands and protests are often met with
advanced bureaucratic procedures and institutionalized channels of action, citizens may
not be encouraged to develop a sense of their own efficacy in the political field. In this
context, citizens may not develop a lively sense of civic responsibility, a responsibility to
keep a check on state power.
Id. at 136.
69 See id at 136-67; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERSONS REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION,
BY STATE: 2006, Table 4b (2006),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/index.html (only 37.6% of
potential New York State voters actually voted, well below the national average).
70 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 128-30.
71 See id. at 129 ("They value expertise and scientific engagement with social problems and
are therefore less likely to pursue strictly punitive responses, which are considered crass and
unscientific.").
72 See id. at 162; ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 52, 208 (2006) (tracing Lockean roots of this idea);
N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Services, Pataki: We'll Reduce Crime Further Across New York State..., 13
Docs TODAY 2, 2 (2004) ("[G]overnment's most important responsibility [is] ensuring the safety and
security of its people.") (quoting Governor George Pataki) [hereinafter Pataki Signs].
7 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 145-46, 167; BARBARA LAVIN MCELENY, CORRECTIONAL
REFORM IN NEW YORK: THE ROCKEFELLER YEARS AND BEYOND 48 (1985) ("With this infection
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also required it to show short-term results.74 Accordingly, rather than investing in
long-term rehabilitative strategies or ones designed to address the causes of crime,
the state turned to targeted incarceration as a remedy.
Targeted incarceration originally primarily meant locking up drug dealers and
users and violent criminals.76 Demonstrating criminal justice system effectiveness
also required early attention to the needs of crime victims, providing them
financial assistance, for example, via a Crime Victims Board to administer a
victim's compensation program as long ago as 1966.n This early attention to
crime victims likely dampened victim outrage, helping to prevent the rise of an
angry victims' rights movement like that in California.
Because it was public safety more than anything else that New York's elites
sought to protect, they also pioneered efforts to soften responses to other sorts of
non-violent crime.79 During Governor Mario Cuomo's time in office, the state
worked to treat non-violent, low-level, non-drug-using offenders relatively
gently.80  Cuomo picked up on earlier commissions' recommendation for
alternatives to incarceration, such as fines, restitution, and community service.
He created the Division of Correctional Alternatives to encourage community-
based programs, yet did so during the state's prison boom. 82 Cuomo and state
legislators depicted these efforts as designed to free up resources to fight serious
and other violent offenders more effectively.8 3
Under Governor Pataki's reign, Pataki rhetorically embraced harsher criminal
punishments as essential to public safety.84 But Pataki did not kill the major
comes crime-theft, burglary, mugging, prostitution, assault, and murder.") (quoting Governor
Nelson Rockefeller).
74 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 129.
s See id. at 129-30.
76 See id at 129-30, 147-49.
See id 142-43; Rockefeller Seeks State Fund to Aid Victims of Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1965, at 1.
78 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 143; N.Y. STATE DIVIsIoN OF THE BUDGET, N.Y.
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1979, Table L-9 (showing rising victim compensation); NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE OF VICTIM SERVICES, http://www.ovs.ny.gov/helpforcrimevictims/helpforcrimevictims.aspx
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (discussing rising victim services).
7 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 153-58.
80 See id at 157; PAMELA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND REALITY
OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 97-99 (1991); Mario Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York, Annual
Message to the Legislature, Jan. 5, 1983, in, PUBLIC PAPERS OF MARIO CUOMO, GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 40-41 (1983).
81 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 157-58; Cuomo, supra note 80, at 39.
82 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 158.
83 See id. at 157-58; Cuomo, supra note 80, at 40 (explaining that the State must "make the
most effective use of police resources" by moving police from low-crime areas to the "fight against
serious, violent, and organized crime").
See BARKER, supra note 24, at 162-63.
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alternatives-to-incarceration-programs. Instead, he pushed for harsher sex-
offender penalties, ended parole for violent first-offenders, and barred work release
for violent felons. Yet, under Pataki, the overall prison population dramatically
declined, emptying prisons of nonthreatening criminals.86 Moreover, Pataki signed
legislation reducing the harshest aspects of the Rockefeller era drug laws." Pataki
considered those drug laws unduly harsh for non-violent offenders, though the
remaining punishment scheme was still far from mild.8 8 But the strong perceived
link between endangered public safety and drug use seemed to be weakening. 9
Pataki described his efforts partly in economic terms, "right-sizing" prisons and
aiming resources more squarely at violent offenders.90 Post-Pataki governors and
legislators have seemed willing to pursue a similar path.91
New York State government's disease model of crime and its focus on
containing violence rather than protecting victims or overtly assailing marginalized
groups seemed to reduce, relative to California, social polarization like that
occurring in the Sunshine State.92 The political system's need to show short-term
results via efficient performance rather than waging moral combat led to relatively
mild sanctioning systems for non-violent crime, harsh ones for violent offenders
and, for a time, also harsh punishments for crimes like drug use that were
popularly associated with violence, however misguided that perception may have
been.93 These simultaneous and opposing forces of incarcerative punishment
versus rehabilitative release softened New York's overly punitive tendencies
85 See id. at 163-64; James Dao, Pataki Bars Sexual Offenders from New Probation Program
for Nonviolent Felons, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1995 at B4 ("I will not gamble with the safety of the
public. People who commit felony sex crimes must serve their time in prison... .") (quoting Governor
Pataki); Gov. GEORGE E. PATAKI, PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY, at N.Y. STATE 2005-06 EXECUTIVE
BUDGET 48 (2005).
86 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 164 (noting HIV testing mandated for offenders "so victims
do not suffer needlessly"); Press Release, N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., Press Release (Jan. 23,
2004) (available at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/PressRel/DOCSinitatives.html).
87 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 164-65; Pataki Signs, supra note 72, at 4.
88 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 165; Pataki Signs, supra note 87, at 4 ("Hundreds of
nonviolent [drug] offenders serving unduly long sentences will have an opportunity to be
immediately reunited with their families" because of "meaningful reform that is both just and
balanced.").
89 See supra note 88.
9 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 164; Joseph B. Treaster, Ideas & Trends: It's Pataki,
Sounding Like Cuomo: Drug Wars Cont.: The Liberals' Unlikely Ally, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at
A3.
91 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 165-66.
92 See id at 167.
9 See id. Supra text accompanying notes 25-92.
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without curtailing them entirely.94 In this respect, elite, pragmatic rule seemed
superior to affluent white populism.9 5
3. Washington State
Washington State, on the other hand, is both politically decentralized and
highly collectively-efficacious, including in setting criminal justice policy.9 6 The
state has an initiative process, but Washington's political culture encourages
deliberation and compromise over domination.97 The system arose from the
progressive populism of the farmers' cooperative movement, "which depended on
collaboration among various social groups and between the state and civil
society."9 Civic engagement, social trust, and reciprocity norms have long been
high.99
Major contributors to civic engagement are Washington's frequent use of
town-hall meetings and hybrid state-citizen commissions, governance mechanisms
heavily used since the 1960s. 00 Major commissions concerning criminal justice
policy included the Washington State Citizens Council on Crime in 1966, the
Washington State Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Citizen Unrest in
1968, and the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission of 1981 to
94 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 167; supra text accompanying notes 25-92.
9s Yet Barker cautions that "state officials have tended to prioritize public security.. .at the
expense of individual freedom and autonomy." BARKER, supra note 24, at 167. Concludes Barker,
"[t]he state's antidemocratic tendencies make it vulnerable to periods of increased punitiveness and
increased reliance on confinement and other forms of state coercion, creating a restrictive form of
citizenship in the name of the public good." Id
96 See id at 42, Table 2.1. Barker measures the degree of centralization using the index of
Governors' Institutional Powers (GIP) and the presence or absence of direct democracy measures like
citizen initiatives. See id. at 42; Thad Beyle, The Governors, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 194, 212-13 (Virginia Gay & Russell L. Hanson eds., 8th ed. 2004)
(collecting GIP measures for various states). Barker measures collective agency by a combination of
voter participation rates and Putnam's composite index of social capital, "which includes how often
people attend local town meetings, participate in local and state politics, and how much people trust
one another." BARKER, supra note 24, at tbl.2.I, at b; see Beyle at 93 (summarizing voter
participation rates for the various states); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) (discussing the concept of, and measure of, social
capital).
9 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 44-45; see generally ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE'S
LOBBY: ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1890-1925 (1997) (comparing organizational politics in California, Washington, and
Wisconsin during the 1890-1925 period and concluding that Washington's progressive-style
populism arose from the farmers' cooperative movement of the time for self-governance).
9 BARKER, supra note 24, at 44.
99 Ida
'0 Id at 44-45.
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1983.101 These hybrid commissions include citizen representatives, civic leaders,
and government actors.102 These commissions "open up a space for dialogue
between civil society organizations and state actors," a space, Barker explains, "not
available through conventional electoral politics" that "can potentially generate
trust among the participants."' 03  The frequent use of town hall meetings is
likewise used to encourage debate among "state officials, ordinary citizens, civic
leaders, grassroots movements, and special interest groups."'0 Says Barker, "[i]n
these settings, participants are encouraged to listen to a range of different
viewpoints and work through dialogue and negotiation to reach a compromise, if
not consensus." 05
These governance practices have numerous benefits. They involve diverse
social groups in the policymaking process, while convincing group members that
their opinions are taken seriously by state elites.106 These practices also promote
the very idea of self-governance as a way to achieve state legitimacy. 0 7 These
habits of cross-group social trust and interaction likewise discourage harsh penal
sanctions.108  Widespread incarceration, particularly if directed at the poor and
racial minorities, infringes liberty, intensifies social divisionio?-as many other
commentators have shown' o-and expands state power over civil society,'
power seemingly wielded by the more against the less powerful.112 When elites
and the marginalized communicate routinely and are used to working together,
101 Id; see David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, in 28
CRIME& JUSTICE 71 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001).
102 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 44-45.
103 See id at 44; Lars Tragardh, Democratic Governance and the Creation of Social Capital in
Sweden: The Discreet Charm of Governmental Commissions, in STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN
NORTHERN EUROPE: THE SWEDISH MODEL RECONSIDERED (Lars Tragardh ed., 2007).
10 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 44.
los See id; compare JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984) (1981) (articulating a theory of the importance of open political
communication).
106 BARKER, supra note 24, at 44-45.
107 id.
los See id ("The institutions and collective agency that make up Washington's democratic
process make polity members reluctant but not unwilling to employ repressive forms of state power
against one another.").
109 Id
110 See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 22-39 (2003); Bruce Western, Mary
Pattillo & David Weiman, Introduction to IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS
INCARCERATION 1, 1-17 (Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western eds., 2004) (summarizing
how mass incarceration promotes family and community breakdown); ALEXANDER, supra note 1.
1I1 BARKER, supra note 24, at 45.
112 See DAVIS, supra note 110; Western, Pattillo & Weiman, supra note 110; ALEXANDER,
supra note 1, at 3-12 (arguing that the criminal justice system in the "new Jim Crow"-a systematic
effort to achieve Black racial subordination).
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they are thus hesitant to turn too readily to incarceration."1 3 The result has been
decades of low imprisonment rates in the state.11
Indeed, Washington State responded to rising crime in poor black
neighborhoods in the 1960s by seeking to eradicate its causes rather than isolating
neighborhood residents behind bars.' 15  White suburbanites, black families, and
civil rights organizations, for example, "worked with the Kirkland Fair Housing
Organization and Operation Equity to challenge residential segregation and
demand equal protection in housing."" These efforts resulted in new laws against
residential racial discrimination,' in contrast to California's 1968 Proposition 14,
which aimed to block fair housing, depicting limits on residential segregation as
limiting individual freedom, a campaign inflaming California's inter-racial
politics." 8 In that same year, by contrast, Washington created a State Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Civil Unrest, which recommended protecting
minorities' labor market participation.' By the early 1970s, the state acted on
these recommendations, creating, among other things, local community
multiservice centers that provided "outreach, counseling, basic education,
vocational and job training, and job placement" to African-Americans in poor
neighborhoods.120  Efforts like these fostered improving minority community
living conditions over criminalizing poverty as the way to contain crime. Crime
was thus viewed more holistically, state policy aiming at its causes as well as its
consequences and policy-setting occurring with the "full and equal political
participation of African Americans." 22
113 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 45 (arguing that mass incarceration "contradict[s] the basic
principles of a deliberative political process rooted in intensive civic engagement, self-governance,
and mutual cooperation," thus making Washington a "penal regime [that] emphasizes the principle of
parsimony, the reliance on the least repressive sanction possible. . .
114 id
"s Id at 102.
116 See id; QUINTARD TAYLOR, THE FORGING OF A BLACK COMMUNITY: SEATrLE'S CENTRAL
DISTRICT FROM 1870 THROUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (1994).
117 BARKER, supra note 24, at 102; see TAYLOR, supra note 116.
" BARKER, supra note 24, at 102; David B. Oppenheimer, California's Anti-discrimination
Legislation, Proposition 14, and the Constitutional Protection of Minority Rights: The Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Calfornia Fair Employment and Housing Act, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117,
124, 126 (2010).
119 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 102; DANIEL J. EVANS, WASHINGTON STATE COMM'N ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF CIVIL UNREST, REPORT ON RACE AND VIOLENCE IN WASHINGTON, 1969,
[hereinafter EVANS, REPORT ON RACE].
120 BARKER, supra note 24, at 102; EVANS, REPORT ON RACE, supra note 119 (source of quote).
121 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 102-03.
122 Id. at 103.
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Thus, from an early date, Washington created subsidy programs to divert
juvenile and adult offenders, not solely first-time ones, away from incarceration.13
A hybrid commission, the Law and Justice Planning Office, urged against
removing offenders from their communities because that would "disrupt[ ] the ties
they have to society, especially employment and family financial support and
relationships."' 24  The state also eventually institutionalized that Office's 1978
recommendations to avoid prison overcrowding, including increasing community
based sentencing alternatives, even for convicted felons; reducing the number of
offenses primarily punishable by incarceration; cutting the number of parolees re-
imprisoned because of technical violations; and expanding parole, work release,
and diversion programs.125 The state also implemented a "correctional volunteer"
program matching newly-released inmates with a "responsible person within the
community, in order to assist the offender to readjust when released from the
institution, 1 26 The state has also long run a community service program, allowing
convicted felons to work on public service projects rather than being
incarcerated.127
Perhaps the best example of Washington's deliberative populism at work is its
sentencing guidelines. Those guidelines are presumptive only, permitting
departure by sentencing judges for good reasons.12 8 The guidelines' underlying
philosophy is using the "least restrictive" sanction to achieve a sanction's purpose,
thus limiting mandatory prison terms to the three violent crimes of murder, assault,
and rape.129 The guidelines heavily emphasize "noncustodial sanctions such as
community supervision, community service, and restitution for a wide range of
lower level offenders."'o3 0  Additionally, the guidelines linked imprisonment to
state prison capacity, generously encouraged good time credits and work release,
and urged "frugal use of the state's resources."'3 ' By the late 1980s, these
guidelines had reduced imprisonment rates by twenty percent.' 32
123 See id. at 103; Richard C. J. Kitto, Jr., Comment-A Perspective on Adult Corrections in
Washington, 51 WASH. L. REv. 495, 504 (1976).
124 BARKER, supra note 24, at 103; WASHINGTON LAW AND JUSTICE PLANNING Div.
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 324 (1970) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN]
(source of quote).
125 BARKER, supra note 24, at 103-04; Testimony to the H. Institutions Comm., July 28, 1978,
1978 Leg. (Wash. 1978) (statement of William Henry, Law and Justice Planning Div.).
126 BARKER, supra note 24, at 104; COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 124, at 338.
127 BARKER, supra note 24, at 104.
128 Id. at 105; Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.725 (West
2010).
129 BARKER, supra note 24, at 105.; Boerner & Lieb, supra note 101, at 105.
13o BARKER, supra note 24, at 105. See Sentencing Reform Act § 9, supra note 128.
131 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 105-06; BARKER, supra note 24, at 106.
132 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 106; Boerner & Lieb, supra note 101, at 95. Compare the
modesty of Washington's guidelines to the harshness of the federal guidelines. See generally
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These enlightened guidelines resulted precisely from the deliberative
populism that characterized state politics.133  Numerous, often conflicting,
viewpoints were given voice repeatedly in public fora.134 The state involved not
only prosecutors and victims' groups, but citizens' groups, interested individuals,
and varied representatives of neighborhoods, races, and classes in the process.
The state legislature's Institutions Committee created a sentencing task force that
brought to the table such diverse groups as the American Civil Liberties Union
Prisoners' Rights Committee and the Families and Friends of Missing Persons and
Violent Crime Victims.'36  The Sentencing Guidelines Commission itself,
including citizen representatives, held statewide public hearings at which "ordinary
people, citizens, voters, and representatives of civil society and professional
associations expressed a range of views on crime control and penal sanctioning." 37
At these meetings, as at most public ones held in Washington, "ordinary people
unaffiliated with either an interest group or professional organization... [were]
strongly encouraged to participate..., a tradition of the underlying political
culture."' 3 8 This collective deliberative effort diffused social tension, encouraged
compromise, maximized viewpoint diversity, and ultimately restrained state
harshness.'3 9 Barker summarized the guidelines as resulting from,
neither a top-down directive from the governor's office, nor the
brainchild of correctional officers, nor a moral protest from the
grassroots. Instead, it was the result of collective enterprise, which was
put into motion and made meaningful by a wide range of state actors and
civil society organizations working within the state's democratized
political structures and deliberative forums. Decentralized decision
making, power sharing, and structural integration of citizen participation
through hybrid commissions provided the institutional mechanisms that
enabled a diverse set of reformers to discuss, debate, and eventually
reach a compromise on sentencing reform and penal sanctioning without
resorting to unilateral decisions, crude policy instruments, or mechanical
responses ... either to public opinion or special interest groups.140
Matthew Jill, One Small Step: The Past, Present, and Future of the Federal Sentencing System, 44
CRIM. L. BULL. 90, 95, 97 (2008) (explaining the harshness of the federal guidelines).
1 See BARKER, supra note 24, at 106.
134 See id. at 106-09.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 107.
13 Id. at 107-08.
138 id.
See id 107-09.
140 Id at 106. But see id. at 118-23 (discussing how, more recently, Washington has adopted
some more repressive measures). Id. at 120 (Barker argues convincingly that the "state's
democratized deliberation and its less repressive penal politics are still rather strong and persistent.").
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4. Some Caveats
The stories in each of these states are, of course, more complex than this
outline suggests. Each system at one time or another can have more or less
pragmatism, unconstrained populism, or deliberation. No single system fits purely
into one category or another. 141 Nevertheless, in relative terms, wild populism,
pragmatism, and deliberativeness well-defined respectively California, New York,
and Washington State.142  Washington's deliberativeness in particular seems to
have powerfully contributed to its limited reliance on incarceration.
Of course, other factors, such as perceived relative crime rates, the size of
minority racial groups, the strength of local conservative versus liberal political
parties, and the health of local economies, likely also contribute to local variations
in reliance on mass incarceration. 14 Yet, as Barker convincingly explains, states
with, for example, similar crime rates may have radically different imprisonment
rates.'" Holding each of these and other factors constant without considering the
See id at 109-23 (It would needlessly prolong my discussion here to focus on her analysis of this
continuing history. I simply refer interested readers to her reasoning in her own words). See also id.
at 109-17 (Particularly interesting is Barker's discussion of how deliberation moderated an initially
vengeful victims' rights movement).
141 See id. at 120 (conceding that Washington's political culture "is influenced by multiple and
competing political traditions, tensions that are not fully resolved," but with deliberativeness
dominating). See generally KATHERINE BECKETr & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA (2009) (tracing the restrictions placed on the geographic movement of
the homeless and lower-class racial minorities by new legal mechanisms in Seattle, Washington).
Barker optimistically summarizes her study of Washington State as follows:
Deliberative democracy to a certain degree is based on and facilitates a sense of
reciprocity and mutual respect. In Washington, polity members tend to be less willing to
inflict imprisonment on one another out of a concern for others' well-being and
autonomy. At the same time, I tried to show how a democratic process that is rooted in a
more progressive form of populism with its narratives of mutual cooperation, public
goods, and self-governance provides the institutional and cultural support to restrain the
repressive powers of the state in favor of the authority and control of civil society
organizations. Also, the legacy of cooperatives and self-governance provide the cultural
and institutional support necessary for officials to pursue noncustodial community
sanctions based primarily on the discipline of labor and the perceived virtues but coercive
powers of civil society. Taken together, these policies and practices restrain state
coercion, creating more inclusionary but normalizing conditions of citizenship.
BARKER, supra note 24, at 123.
142 BARKER, supra note 24, at 141-42.
143 See David Jacobs & Aubrey L. Jackson, On the Politics of Imprisonments: A Review of
Systematic Findings, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sd. 129, 132-43 (2010).
'" See BARKER, supra note 24, at 16-17. It is important to stress that Barker's study addresses
reliance on mass incarceration, the subject of this symposium. Another author has come up with a
forty-four item indicator of overall "state punitiveness," a much broader measure than incarceration.
See BEsIKI KUTATELADZE, Is AMERICA REALLY So PUNITIVE? EXPLORING A CONTINUUM OF U.S.
STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES 14-15 (2009). On this measure, Washington was in the second
least punitive quintile, as was New York, though New York was more punitive than Washington, and
California was in the second most punitive quintile. See id. at 247-50. The forty-four measures were
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influence of governmental structure simply does not tell the whole tale. Studying
the strength or weakness of deliberative populist governmental structures and
political cultures helps to complete the story. Indeed, as we will shortly see, other
analogous empirical data lend further support to Barker's conclusions.
B. A Comparative Law Analogy
1. The Mildness of Coordinated Market Economies
A comparative law analogy buttresses the case for the role that broader
deliberative populist democracy can play in restraining or reversing the growth of
mass imprisonment. Recent comparative social science research has focused on
the differences between "coordinated market economies" [CMEs] and "liberal
market economies" [LMEs], the former relying far less on mass incarceration than
does the latter.145
CMEs have several characteristics. Notably, they "incorporate[] a wide range
of social groups and institutions into a highly co-ordinated governmental structure.
. .."146 Their economies are highly regulated, with opportunities for varied groups
to make their wishes known in the regulatory process.147  CMEs tend to be
divided into five broad types of punitiveness: (1) political and symbolic punishment; (2)
incarceration; (3) punishing immorality; (4) conditions of confinement; and (5) juvenile justice. Id.
Although some states show consistency among their measures of punitive harshness, most do not.
See id at 256. New York's measures fluctuated widely, for example, being minimally punitive for
symbolic punishment and punishing immorality but moderately punitive for incarceration and more
than moderately punitive on the remaining measures. See id. at 257. Washington's score solely on
incarceration as a measure was well below New York's and California's. See id at 249-50. This
quantitative data, while not tracking Barker's analysis precisely, is largely consistent with it. It does
emphasize, however, that punitiveness more generally, and mass incarceration specifically, have
multiple causes. Note, too, that Barker sought to choose "representative" states rather than outliers of
most or least punitive states. See BARKER, supra note 24, at 15, 183. Barker also left out the
Southern states from her analysis because of their "historical ties to feudal-like social and political
hierarchies, slavery, weakened central government, and under-democratized polity," putting them on
a different penal developmental path that, in Barker's view, requires its own unique, intensive study.
Id at 21. See also id. at 183-85 (presenting quantitative data on social capital across the fifty states
that offers further support for Barker's more qualitative study of three illustrative states).
145 See NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 58-60 (2008); see also Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An
Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8 (Peter A. Hall and David Soskice eds., 2001)
(coining the CME and LME language); cf generally Nicola Lacey & Lucia Zedner, Discourses of
Community in Criminal Justice, 22 J. L. & Soc'Y 301, 302, 311, 318 (1995) (applying these
categories to German criminal justice).
'" LACEY, supra note 145, at 58.
147 See id. at 58-59; Bob Hancke, Introducing the Debate, in DEBATING VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM: A READER 1, 1-16 (Bob Hancke ed., 2009).
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associated with proportional representation legislative schemes.148 This results in
multi-party governance, with many of these parties each representing a relatively
small subset of the population.149 Governing thus requires compromise among
these groups.'50 Electoral politics is thus itself inclusionary, often requiring
coalition governments and some measure of consensus.' 5 ' The need to build
consensus also acts as a constraint on wide swings in popular opinion because it is
rare that any one party--even one enamored of the popular majority opinion of the
moment--can govern without paying significant heed to minority views.152
This electoral tendency toward greater inclusiveness also tends to make left-
of-center governments in CMEs more frequent.' 53  Even right-leaning CME
governments are more likely to be left of what constitutes the center in the United
States.154  Furthermore, building inter-party coalitions requires an express
commitment to at least certain policy stances acceptable to all the coalition
partners. 5s Center-left governments are more likely because the center represents
the middle classes, who generally have an interest in maintaining relatively robust
levels of public services, a goal shared by the left, which would prefer even higher
levels of such services.' 56 Correspondingly, the center constrains the left's often
extraordinarily expensive demands.' 5 7  Relatively high levels of party discipline
enable center-left governments to be reasonably effective at implementing the
grand electoral bargain. 58 The result of these inclusive, center-left politics is a
generous welfare state, a greater commitment to government involvement in the
economy to make good on electoral commitments, and in response to multi-group
demands, a greater effort by the state to encourage citizen training in job-specific
skills in the industries that further governmental goals and as a way of maintaining
an impression of state support for economic and job stability. 5 9 Educating
148 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 63-64. But see id. at 64 n. 7 (noting that New Zealand is the
exception, having a unique history).
149 See id at 64-66.
1so See id. at 66 (noting CMEs' "consensus-building dynamic").
' See id at 67-68.
152 See id.
5 See id. at 67. See generally Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Electoral Institutions and the
Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others, 100 AM. POL. SCL
REv. 165 (2006) (making this point and concluding that there are relatively greater degrees of
economic equality in LMEs).
154 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 58-59, 67-68, 121-22 (noting that the United States is the
"extreme case" of an individualistic, non-interventionist state with weak coordinating
institutions-the exact opposite of the CMEs and their typically left-of-center governments).
"s See id. at 67.
156 See id. at 67-68.
' See id. at 68.
1ss See id. at 67-68, 76-77 (discussing the "discipline of coalition politics").
s See id 78-80.
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workers thus also becomes a major function of CME governments.' 60 CMEs have
thus apparently done a better job than LMEs in maintaining a reasonably large
manufacturing sector rather than devolving into a largely services-providing
economy.16 1
Because CME policies are more insulated from wide, emotional swings in
public opinion, while being expected to deliver on electoral commitments in a
disciplined way, and because professional expertise is needed so to deliver, CMEs
tend to be more deferential toward their professional bureaucrats.162  The
coalitional nature of government also depolarizes it, reducing the obsession of any
one governing-party-of-the-moment for retaining absolute, uncompromising
control over every aspect of policymaking.163 This too increases deference toward
bureaucrats and their social status.'64 Additionally, because bureaucrats are seen as
part of the civil service, they are consulted on criminal justice policy, improving
their ability sometimes to veto misguided criminal justice efforts by various
' See id. at 79.
161 See id. at 79-80.
162 See id at 71, 72-75. Other commentators have stressed the moderating effect on
punitiveness of criminal justice experts having major input into criminal justice policies in much of
Europe. See Jacobs & Jackson, supra note 143, at 143. Part of the explanation that they offer is that
more educated persons, which by definition includes criminal justice experts, tend toward less
punitive responses to crime. See id. They also tend to describe what I here call CMEs as "centralized
democracies," id., in which "elites representing factions with conflicting interests meet to reach
compromises, which are left largely unchallenged by non-elites." Id. at 144. The emphasis in these
descriptions is on the supposed hierarchical nature of such societies, thus freeing experts to rule
policy rather than uninformed laypersons doing so. See id. But political scientist Nicola Lacey,
whom I cite liberally here, and I look at the matter through a different lens. In Lacey's view, the
broader incorporation of numerous interests in which many different groups are represented allows
for more inclusive, deliberative, respectful politics. See LACEY, supra note 145 and accompanying
text. Such a politics is closer to having many of the key features of PDD than is a more direct
populist democracy like the United States. All deliberative processes of high quality require
accurate, complete information, and it is those processes themselves that thus arguably breed more
respect for experts and more willingness to defer to them. "Corporatism" is thus for me a form of
representative deliberative democracy better insulated from direct, raw populist opinion than systems
like that of the United States. Even those emphasizing corporatist hierarchy agree that the result is "a
solidaristic society that attempts to bring all individuals into full citizenship." Jacobs & Jackson,
supra note 143, at 144. Such a society stresses reintegration of offenders into society rather than
"segregation, incapacitation, and retribution." Id. Such societies depend more on civil society's
restraints, "which place much greater emphasis on community than on individual rights." Id.; see
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 49 (2001) (making a similar point first). I also prefer
Lacey's emphasis because she helps to explain why corporatist democratic cultures depoliticize
criminal justice policy in a way that allows experts and criminal justice bureaucrats to impact policy
more effectively. See LACEY, supra note 145.
16 See id. at 72.
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parties.165 The term "professional bureaucrats" includes judges, prosecutors, and
other governmental criminal justice officials.166
However, professional criminal justice bureaucracies are relatively
independent of momentary public passions, rooting their status in professional
expertise rather than electoral appeal, thus able to act free from undue interference
by the governing party leader; accordingly, the bureaucracy tends to constrain the
severity of criminal justice policy.167 The broad-based, coalitional nature of the
electoral system also makes it harder for any one social group to use criminal
justice as a way to wage war on another such group.168  The more effective
representation of diverse views on nearly every subject, including criminal justice
policy, likewise makes it harder for group polarization-the tendency of members
of like-minded groups largely repeating similar arguments among themselves to
become more extreme in those views-to occur.169 The more generous welfare
state also reduces poverty, social isolation, and other arguably criminogenic social
situations.o70 Lower crime in turn reduces the logical, though not necessarily the
perceived, need for harsh criminal justice policies.!'7 Furthermore, greater relative
political and economic equality moderates views of certain groups or individuals
16 Id. at 72-74 (noting that CME bureaucrats are "an important constraint on ad hoc
policymaking.").
116 Id. at 72.
167 Id. at 72-73, 75; MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL SYsTEMs: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 35-36, 55, 102, 105, 114-23, 132, 180-83 (2006) (surveying numerous nations to
establish that strong bureaucracies weaken criminal justice harshness); Joachim J. Savelsberg,
Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment Revisited, I PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 45, 64 (1999);
David Downes, Visions of Penal Control in the Netherlands, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 93, 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007).
168 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 74-75 (comparing CMEs to two illustrative LMEs: the
United States and Great Britain and explaining the electoral dynamic).
169 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNsTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 1-3
(2009) (defining group polarization).
170 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 80 Figure 3 (showing that poverty reduction via
redistribution tends to be higher in CMEs than LMEs), 81 Figure 4 (showing poverty reduction via
vocational training intensity to be higher in CMEs than LMEs), 86 (reducing absolute and relative
poverty by generous welfare provisions should have a "knock on effect on crime").
171 See Jacobs & Jackson, supra note 143, at 131 (noting that "crime rates do not have a close
relationship with ... imprisonment rates."). These authors examine empirical data suggesting that the
Republican Party often wins state-level elections by painting a picture of an enormous political and
racial threat from rampant criminality, requiring a harsh law-and-order response. Once in office,
Republicans keep their word, imposing harsher plea bargains, seeking harsher sentences, and building
more prisons. See id. at 133-38. Democrats are limited in their ability to fully mimic this strategy
because their core ideological constituencies include less punitive minority voters. See id. at 136-37.
The Republican strategy may partly be effective precisely because it exaggerates the danger crime
poses, suggesting that the public would be somewhat less punitive if aware of, and believing in, the
true state of affairs. See infra text accompanying notes 310-48.
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as socially-degraded.172  Likewise, citizens come to view the criminal justice
system as more about deterrence and rehabilitation than state-imposed
degradation.' 7 1 This attitude too discourages undue reliance on mass
incarceration.174
Indeed, the CME Western social-democracies (the most left-leaning CMEs)
of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway have vastly lower imprisonment and
homicide rates than do the Western LMEs of the United States, South Africa, New
Zealand, England and Wales, and Australia.'75 The more conservative, corporatist
CMEs, such as the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and France, likewise have
markedly lower rates on these scores than do the LMEs.' 76 Of course, no country
is purely coordinated or liberal, there being degrees of each tendency present in
each country at particular times.177  A widely-respected rating of the relative
degree of coordination clearly shows ever-higher coordination levels associated
with ever-lower imprisonment and homicide rates. 78  The contrast between the
highest and lowest coordination-level economies of respectively Norway (highest)
and the United States (lowest) is particularly striking: 73 persons imprisoned, 82
murdered per 100,000 population in Norway versus 701 persons imprisoned, 737
murdered per 100,000 in the United States. 7 9
2. The Harshness of Liberal Market Economies
LMEs and CMEs are bizarro-world doppelgangers. LMEs make a fetish of an
imagined perfect free-market economy characterized by vibrant economic and
172 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 81-84 (discussing that greater economic inequality breeds
disrespect by those on the higher rungs for those on the bottom, thus reducing the power of respect as
a moderating force on criminal justice policy); RICHARD SENNETT, RESPECT IN A WORLD OF
INEQUALITY 23 (2003) (noting the problem of "showing mutual respect across the boundaries of
inequality"); Ken Pease, Punishment Demand and Punishment Numbers, in POLICY AND THEORY IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113 (Don M. Gottfredson & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1990) (explaining further the
link among economic inequality, status inequality, and criminal punishment); cf JAMES WHITMAN,
HARSH JUSTICE 193 (2003) (noting the degrading purpose of most criminal punishment in the United
States despite our formal commitment to status egalitarianism).
1 Cf LACEY, supra note 145, at 84 (noting anti-degradation mentality is weak in CMEs).
174 See id (explaining that lower disparities in wealth and long-term skills investment and a
consensus or bargaining-oriented political system in CMEs "make it easier for governments to pursue
inclusionary criminal justice policies").
" See id. at 60, Figure 1.
176 See id
177 See id (assigning a "coordination index rating" to each nation discussed based upon the
degree of market coordination versus liberalism).
178 LACEY, supra note 145.
1 See id; cf Michael Tonry, Punishment Policies and Patterns in Western Countries, in
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 3, 3-28 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase
eds., 2001) (summarizing the similarities and differences in sentencing practices among Western
countries, with the United States at the harshest end of the continuum).
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political competition in a relatively regulatory-free world.180  Of course, LME
economies in practice far from fulfill this ideal, and at least one of the major
parties in each such economy tends to favor more activist, interventionist
regulatory policy.'8 But even for such parties, government intervention is seen as
largely a sometimes necessary evil, helping to correct for departures from, or flaws
in, the effort to implement the imaginary ideal.182 LME cultures include a strong
strain envisioning government as itself a necessary evil, its exercise of its power to
be limited to constraining greater evils.183 LME cultures likewise tend to embrace
intense adversarialism, a logic of winners and losers.'" Life is a contest. The
strong survive. 85 Perhaps the weak do not die, but their weakness marks them as
deserving of a less happy life than achieved by their stronger compatriots.' 86 If the
strong choose to show compassion toward their inferiors, that is a stance to be
applauded, but it is lauded precisely because it is an act of charity-a free choice,
in a sense, to show mercy toward the undeserving.'87 Mercy as government policy
would thus violate the natural order, depriving the deserving of control over the
resources they have earned, compromising their autonomy relative to the less-
deserving losers.'88
180 See infra text accompanying notes 181-289.
' In the United States, that party is the Democratic Party. See generally JULES WITCOVER,
PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS 517-697 (2003) (tracing history and policies
of the modem Democratic Party).
182 See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF
GOVERNMENT 297 (1999).
183 See id.; BARKER, supra note 24, at 63 (noting "the American disposition to be suspicious of
state power").
184 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 64 ("[L]iberal market economies tend to have first-past-the-
post, winner-takes-all systems."); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS:
How WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 98-100
(2010) (describing the current American politico-economic system as one designed increasingly to
benefit winners at the expense of losers, thus dramatically sharpening economic inequality).
185 See DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: STOPPING AMERICA'S WAR OF WORDS
(1999) (documenting and deriding America's culture of contest).
186 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination
and Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 447 (2009) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Tinkerbell] (discussing Americans' difficulty having compassion for the "undeserving,"
including those too weak to pull their own weight); Lisa A. Crooms, Don't Believe the Hype: Black
Women, Patriarchy, and the New Welfarism, 38 How. L.J. 611 (1995) (arguing that images of poor
Black women as undeserving of help led to the end of America's earlier welfare system and its
replacement by its modem more limited form).
187 See Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 186, at 447 (discussing social forces encouraging and
discouraging compassion in America, including a lower likelihood of compassion toward those
whom we see as fundamentally different from us); LINDA Ross MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY 4
(2010) (offering one definition of mercy "as a compassionate gift to an undeserving guilty
person... ").
188 Cf BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH
OF NATURAL ORDER 31 (2011) (arguing that America's embrace of the idea that the free market
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A weakly regulatory, highly individualistic, adversarial economic and
political culture leads to flexibility and innovation having priority over stability
and long-term public investment in education and job-specific skills.' 9 This
dynamism, accompanied by a distrust of state power, leads to a relatively weaker
welfare state and a less coordinated state commitment to maintaining worker
skills. 190 Workers are largely left to fend for themselves.1'9 This ideological
commitment to individual economic independence via struggle leads to more
poverty and life-course economic instability, again arguably factors contributing to
higher crime rates.' 92 Higher resulting economic inequality fosters greater inter-
group tension, particularly because economic losers are viewed as somehow
tainted.'93
The adversarial culture also may help to promote a two-party system. In all
political systems, compromise and negotiation necessarily occur. But adversarial
LMEs more closely embrace a winner-take-all mentality.194  That mentality,
combined with a narrower range of social groups having effective representation,
achieves a "natural order" not to be disturbed by the state is complemented by the idea that criminals
challenge that natural order and are beyond it, thus enabling, without alone causing, harsh American
criminal justice policies); Jacobs & Jackson, supra note 143, at 133 ("Libertarian Republicans are
inclined to see criminals as unfettered individuals whose freely made decisions make them morally
accountable for their pernicious acts.").
189 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 58-59.
'9o See id at 81-85.
'1 See id. at 85-90.
192 See id. at 82-83; cf David Downes & Kirstine Hansen, Welfare and Punishment in
Comparative Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 133 (Sarah Armstrong & Lesley McAra
eds., 2006) (demonstrating that countries with more generous welfare spending, with rare exceptions,
have lower imprisonment rates than those with less generous welfare expenditures); Katherine
Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 35
(David Garland ed., 2001) (finding a similar relationship among American states, that is, those with
lower levels of welfare spending largely had higher levels of incarceration and vice-versa; states with
larger racial minority populations also had higher incarceration rates, adding to the authors'
conclusion that welfare and incarceration regimes are but two aspects of a single regime for
controlling "social marginality"); see generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN
AMERICA (2006) (tracing in greater detail the interaction among American social, economic, and
criminal justice policies).
19 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 83 (noting markedly greater LME economic disparities
themselves become a form of status distinction encouraging degradation of the lower-status group);
supra text accompanying notes 172-73 (discussing degradation, stigma, and other forms of social
taint).
194 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 184, at 3-5; LACEY, supra note 145, at 64; TASLITZ,
CULTURE AND THE COURTROOM, supra note 13, at 37-44, 58-63, 134-51 (discussing how adversarial
culture works in American courtrooms to silence socially and economically weaker voices).
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valorizes conflict over settlement.'95  When compromise occurs, furthermore, the
bargain is struck among fewer social groups, 96 leaving others as outcasts.' 97
The winner-take-all attitude also leads the winning party to seek to dominate
all levels of policymaking while it has control.198 That makes appointment of
bureaucrats more political, their role seen as less an independent, stable,
professional source of policy input than servants of the governing party's will.1 99
Those bureaucrats envisioned as independent of the executive and the legislature-
primarily the judiciary-are, however, themselves often paradoxically subject to
more overtly political influences. 200 This subjection is strongest in the many states
relying on an elected judiciary, judicial elections increasingly mimicking
legislative and executive ones in their campaign style and consequences.20'
Bureaucracies thus fail to achieve deference in policy consultation with other
government actors, limiting their role in constraining extreme policies, particularly
in criminal justice.202
LME elections, in turn, tend to be determined by a large block of median
voters, whose party affiliation (or lack thereof) does not determine their vote.203
These floating median voters view crime as a threat.20 Indeed, the demonization
195 The winner-take-all mentality and limitation to a two-party system without proportional
representation partly account for narrower group representation. See TANNEN, supra note 185, at 23
(discussing valorization of conflict); supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
See LACEY, supra note 145, at 65-66.
197 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 54-58 (2003) (explaining how class and racial stigma renders the stigmatized "subpersons"
excluded from complete, respectful treatment as equal members of political society).
198 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 72-74; Jacobs & Jackson, supra note 143, at 135-39
(discussing elected-Republican dominance of criminal justice policy at the state level).
199 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 72-75.
2 See id. at 94-97.
201 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (recognizing a
free speech right of judicial candidates for office to recite overt policy positions to the electorate);
Jacobs & Jackson, supra note 143, at 137-38 (summarizing data showing that lenient elected judges
risk losing their seats).
202 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 96 (arguing that the American judiciary's exclusion from
overt policy consultation with the executive and legislative branches has led the latter to "regard the
judiciary as an irksome and even irresponsible thorn in the flesh of criminal justice policy, to be
thwarted as often as possible by legislative or other means," while its constitutional tools to resist
government excesses "have tended to be relatively weak in the face of a determined executive with a
clear legislative majority."); see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 111-40
(2009).
203 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 66-67. See generally Paul Chevigny, The Populism of
Fear: Politics of Crime in the Americas, 5 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 77 (2003) (discussing fear of crime
as a populist political motivator uniting voters across party lines and throughout the Americas); Bert
Useem, Raymond V. Liedka, & Anne Morrison Piehl, Popular Support for the Prison Build-up, 5
PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 5, 5-9 (2003).
204 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 69-71, 76, 177-79.
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of the poor because they are poor and of marginalized racial groups links group
membership with criminality. 205 Because such groups have inadequate political
representation and power, there are no structural safeguards against declaring, for
example, a "war on drugs" that ends up being a war on an entire racial
socioeconomic group.206  The low social status of the poor, exacerbated by
economic inequality, also makes demonizing them easier.207 Furthermore, because
government action can be justified only on grounds of suppressing a greater evil,
and government's greatest power is arrest and punishment, the exercise of that
power is more readily seen as a marker of its subjects' degraded nature. 208
Punishment thus serves to degrade, isolate, and purify at least as much as to deter
or rehabilitate.209
Harsh criminal justice system policies thus have political appeal to both major
parties in LMEs. 210  Harsher policies do not require new bureaucracies or novel
implementation mechanisms but merely the expansion of pre-existing institutions
necessary in any society.211 As one commentator put it, "Mass imprisonment
allows the political order to address its most vulnerable problem, crime, with a
solution that is solvable precisely at the process level where Feeley and Sarat []
and many political scientists before and since have thought government was pretty
205 See Crooms, supra note 186, at 611-12, 614, 621-28 (discussing demonization of the poor,
especially the Black poor); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind
Justice, 5 OHIo ST. J. CRiM. L. 1, 3-13 (2007) (discussing subconscious processes leading to
demonization and fear of the Black poor).
206 See GLENN C. LOuRY, RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 11 (2008) (arguing
for a race-based explanation for rising American incarceration rates); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 31-35 (1995) (arguing that the War on Drugs
was probably actually foreseen to be a war on poor racial minorities, particularly African-
Americans).
207 See Crooms, supra note 186, at 611-13, 615, 620-28 (analyzing low social status of the
poor, though not always using that terminology); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The
Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R -C.L L. REv. 393, 399-405 (2009) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Judging Jena] (discussing the social functions of racial status and its cousin, racial esteem, and their
opposites); supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussing view of the poor as unworthy).
208 See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 53 (2009) (arguing that criminal convictions, especially of racial minorities, are
powerfully stigmatizing, creating difficult obstacles to ex-offenders finding jobs); WILLS, supra note
182 (discussing Americans' views of government as, at best, a necessary evil).
209 See generally Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena 6, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization
of Civil Rights, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477 (2009) (arguing that the unique combination of racial
poverty and residential segregation, the related decline of the working poor, and the misguided policy
of mass incarceration have subjected poverty-stricken African-Americans to harshly disparate
criminal punishment, a consequence that reinforces community poverty, isolation, fear, and crime).
210 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 69-71; Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on
Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
397 (2006) (analyzing the connection between partisan politics and media coverage of crime).
211 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 69-70; SIMON, supra note 202, at 25-26.
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successful."212 Weak party discipline makes party platforms more important to
swaying median voters, further adding to the appeal of tough-on-crime policies. 213
Moreover, in decentralized democracies characterized by high levels of class
and racial segregation, as is true in the United States, local politicians can readily
advocate popular policies whose costs "do not necessarily fall on the[ir] electoral
constituency," or at least not fully so. 214 Once again, harsh criminal punishment
fits this bill. 215  The lack of broadly-inclusive, multi-party compromise and a
strong professional bureaucracy shatters buffers between high majoritarian
emotional fervor and policymaking.216 This de-bufferization permits politicians to
arouse passions rooted in fear of crime, fanning the flames of real and imagined
dangers to stoke voter passions, an effective competition for the median voters'
support. 217 But this promise to cure crime in turn heightens voter expectations of
success in doing so.218 Enlarging the resources devoted to arresting and
imprisoning offenders creates the impression of such success, as does
criminalizing ever more conduct.219
CME political and economic structure does not guarantee milder criminal
justice policies on all fronts. For example, there is some reason to believe that
CME obsession with stability makes CMEs more resistant, in the long run, to
incorporating immigrants-viewed as an unsettling outside force-into the
political economy than is true in LMEs.220  The very dynamism of LMEs and
willingness to reward winners may, despite periodic nativist fervor, make LMEs
more open to accepting immigrants into the system who "play by the rules," that is,
who shed signs of difference, while accepting and managing to succeed in
212 SIMoN, supra note 202, at 159.
213 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 70.
214 See id. at 71; Jeannine Bell, Hate Thy Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the
Persistence of Segregation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 47, 48-54 (2007) (collecting data and marshaling
theoretical arguments supporting the idea that current housing and hate crimes laws are inadequate to
address low-level hate crimes aimed at maintaining residential racial segregation; local politicians
likely have little incentive to change the status quo where, as in this example, the law's cost falls on
the excluded racial minorities rather than on the white majority voters in the legislator's district).
215 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 70-71.
216 See id. at 71-72 (discussing voter fervor in majoritarian systems); supra text accompanying
notes 162-166 (discussing the buffering role of the bureaucracy in CMEs).
217 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 71 ("What we see in the latter [majoritarian systems] is a
vicious cycle of mutual reinforcement, grounded in a set of incentives conducing to politicians'
attraction to single issues such as criminal justice, which are, superficially, easy to demonstrate that
they have been acted upon.
218 See id
219 See id at 71-72; DOUGLAS HusAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw 3-17 (2008) (documenting the massive expansion in American criminal law and its
accompanying growth in punishment, especially via mass incarceration).
220 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 148-49; Lokc Wacquant, 'Suitable Enemies': Foreigners
and Immigrants in the Prisons of Europe, 1 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 215, 216 (1999) ("From this point
of view,foreigners and quasi-foreigners would be the 'blacks' of Europe. ") (emphasis in original).
162 [Vol 9:1
THE CRIMINAL REPUBLIC
adversarial struggles. 221 To say that LMEs may be more successful at this task in
the long run, if they truly are, is, of course, very different from saying that they do
a normatively good job in welcoming "foreigners."222
Moreover, global financial crises and the globalization of economics may
strain CME commitment to a vigorous welfare state, though it seems unlikely that
they will pare welfare benefits down to those in the United States.223
Correspondingly, the high financial and social costs of mass imprisonment,
particularly in the extreme case of the United States, create pressures at some point
to slow the influx into the system.224 Nor does it make sense to believe that
punishment tendencies in either CMEs or LMEs cannot be altered by political
reforms, for example, by sustained social movements- to push toward a more
inclusive politics in the United States without entirely sacrificing its current
22political-economic system.225 Furthermore, I am always skeptical of reductionist
theories, so I do not claim that political inclusiveness alone explains criminal
justice system policies. Country-specific circumstances also contribute to outliers
like Canada, a relatively punishment-mild LME.226 I likewise make no claim that
CMEs are overall superior or inferior societies to LMEs.
Nevertheless, the CME-LME comparison offers powerful reason to believe
that CMEs are far less likely than LMEs to resort to mass incarceration. This
reluctance is due in significant part to a more inclusive, compromise-oriented
political system offering more opportunities to varied social groups for continued,
between-elections effective voice in their fates. CME criminal justice policies are
221 See Ediberto Romin, The Alien Invasion?, 45 Hous. L. REv. 841 897 (2008) (quoting
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton as saying she favored "a path to earned legalization to
undocumented immigrants who are willing to work hard, play by the rules, learn English and pay
fines") (footnote omitted).
222 See generally Claire Valier, Foreigners, Crime and Changing Mobilities, 43 BlIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003) (discussing the concept of the "foreigner" in twentieth-century American
culture and academic writing); see also Thomas R. Dominczyk, The New Melting Pot: As American
Attitudes toward Foreigners Continue to Decline, Athletes are Welcomed With Open Arms, 8 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 165 (1998) (discussing inconsistencies in Americans' reception and treatment of
immigrants from different backgrounds).
223 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 131-34, 137-38, 142, 144.
224 See id. at 186-86. Marc Mauer argues, however, that retrenchment of mass incarceration in
the United States because of the enormous cost of the endeavor is likely to be limited given the strong
emotional hold of retribution "on a populace further sensitized to the risks of violent crime by a TV
media that propagates widespread images of both violence and effective policing in response to it."
Id. at 183-84; Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, 3
PUNISHMENT& SOCIETY 9, 15-17 (2001).
225 See LACEY, supra note 145, at 191-92 (arguing that bipartisan agreement on a national
criminal justice commission, followed by assigning future criminal justice policy to "institutions
encompassing both wide representation and expertise" might de-politicize criminal justice policy in
LMEs).
226 See id. at 27, 118, 181-82. Lacey also notes that America's sorry history of racial conflict
is an example of a country-specific circumstance that likely magnifies other LME forces contributing
to penal harshness in the United States. See id at 123-29.
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also probably better informed than LME policies because of the former's greater
deference to a professionalized criminal justice bureaucracy. The clash of more
diverse viewpoints among more varied social groups also enhances information-
levels, reduces group polarization, and encourages inter-group conversation. The
consequence is more-informed, deliberative, inclusive dialogue about criminal
justice policy than is true in places like the United States. Comparative political
science thus provides further analogical support for the idea that a more vibrant,
populist, deliberative, democracy in the United States would help to restrain, or
perhaps reverse, this country's commitment to mass incarceration.
C. Urban Racial Localism
1. Who is Heard in Federal and State Legislatures
So far, this section has examined interstate and international data. But
intrastate and local data also demonstrate the virtues of PDD. Political scientist
Lisa L. Miller did a particularly relevant study comparing group representation in
criminal justice legislative policy setting at the federal, state, and local levels.227
Miller's state- and local-level data focused primarily on the state of Pennsylvania
and the cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.228 That data revealed strong
representation at the state and local legislative levels of pro-incarceration groups,
weak representation of anti-incarceration groups. 229 However, at the local level-
which lacks the power and resources alone significantly to influence federal and
statewide criminal justice policy-the anti-incarceration forces fared much
better.230
Thus, by far the largest percentage of witnesses at federal congressional and
state legislative hearings were criminal justice and law enforcement institutional
agencies: the police, immigration officials, judges, and Treasury and military
officials.2 31 Single-issue citizens' groups, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving
or Women Organized Against Rape, again favoring harsher policies, also did
227 See generally LISA MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS
OF CRIME CONTROL 15 (2008) (discussing the study).
22. See id. at 21, 193-99.
229 See id. at 112-13.
230 See id. at 130-35.
231 See id. at 95-96, 98; cf SIMON, supra note 202, at 4 (arguing that recent federal and state
legislative policies have resulted in a system of elite "governance through crime"). Governance
through crime is characterized by three features: (1) acting in the name of crime control or analogous
problems legitimates governmental interventions; (2) but the crime control label masks other political
motivations; and (3) the metaphors of crime control invidiously migrate to subtly alter governance in
some more local institutions, such as schools, family, and workplaces-all with the predictable result
of further isolating poor racial minorities, reducing judicial power as a check on governmental
abuses, and undermining the democratic nature of American politics. See id. at 4-5.
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well.232 Professional associations of lawyers, doctors, and social service agencies
having strong representation were largely those who stood to benefit from
government criminal justice largesse.233  The single-issue citizens' groups and
criminal justice agencies also tended to be repeat legislative players. 234  But
broadly-representative, multi-issue citizens' groups favoring more comprehensive,
rehabilitation-oriented criminal justice reform were woefully underrepresented,
constituting, for example, but 1.5% of the total number of federal and 3% of the
total number of state legislative witnesses.235 Moreover, most of these multi-issue
groups were not repeat legislative players.236
These differences in power-disparities were not limited to the dramatic
differences in the percentage of witnesses testifying.237  Thus, government
agencies and other institutions lobby overtly, engaging in a wide range of informal
legislative contacts and having "relatively unfettered access to legislators."238
They also have substantial resources-financial, temporal, and symbolic-with
which to bring political pressure to bear.239 The voices of prosecutors, corrections
officials, probation departments, and crime commissions are loudly heard.240
Although professional groups as a whole are also fairly active, they tend to focus
on specialized interests important to their members.241
Legislators listen to these organized groups partly because of a belief in their
expertise on complex issues.242 Legislators also tend to look for fairly simple,
specific, concrete policy solutions to readily identifiable problems, and solutions
232 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 67.
233 Id. at 79.
234 Id. at 77-78, 98-99.
235 Id. at 67-68.
236 See id. at 68; cf MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY
AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20-23, 116-17 (2008) (arguing that federal- versus state-level federalism
has failed, with many of the virtues of state level authority, such as providing government closer to
the people and encouraging policy experimentation, being better served at the level of the
municipality, town, and village).
237 Cf FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 236, at 20-23, 116-17 (arguing that state-level
government is now both rigid and beholden to the powerful, making it slow in responding to local
community needs).
238 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 103-05.
239 See id at 72, 103, 118.
240 Id at 80.
241 See id at 98.
242 Id at 80. The one major group with obvious expertise that repeatedly advocated for the
poor in the area of criminal justice policy was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See id.
at 7, 182. But the ACLU, despite its history as an advocate for the legal rights of all, see SAMUEL
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 5 (2d ed. 1999), adopts a narrow,
legalistic approach focusing primarily on individualistic or process-oriented issues (for example,
affecting the rights of the accused) that fall far from the more diffuse, quality-of-life issues of concern
to the urban poor. See MILLER, supra note 227, at 116-17.
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that can be touted to the electorate. 243 Organized groups often provide just that,
appearing with focused draft legislation and reams of supporting documents and
research on narrow questions. 244  These groups have a strong stake in such
questions, money from state budgets or membership dues giving these groups the
resources to do their political job, and repeat player status allowing them to cozy
up to state legislators and their staff.245
Furthermore, federal and state legislatures as a whole represent majorities-
meaning middle class whites-and many legislators cannot win reelection by
catering to minority rather than majority needs.246 A public too busy to investigate
the facts and swayed by the fear-mongering of politicians using anxiety over crime
as an electoral tool likewise defers to the demands that politicians make good on
their tough-on-crime promises. 247 There are, therefore, strong political reasons for
legislators to heed the word of groups who urge harsher criminal justice system
policies that, within broad limits, expand the groups' own budget and power. State
criminal justice institutions and single-issue citizens' groups thus tend to stress
ever-harsher punishments and isolated, simplistic solutions to the complex
problem of crime and its control.248 These observations extend not simply to what
is criminalized, but also to how police and prosecutors are allowed to-or
encouraged to-do their jobs.249
Broad, informal, anti-incarceration citizens' groups, like neighborhood
associations, come from the most heavily-policed, most crime-ridden
neighborhoods.250 These small, multi-issue groups lack the resources and technical
243 Id. at 70-71, 80.
244 See id at 107-08.
245 idat88,118.
246 See, e.g., Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey S. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election '08, and the
Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 669 (2010) (noting that Barack Obama
was only the third African-American in history elected to the United States Senate); DAVID T.
CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK
MAJORITY DISTRICTS 91 (1999) ("Most white representatives from black influence districts do not
spend much time representing their black constituents, while most black members of Congress spend
a substantial portion of their time representing white constituents.").
247 RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES 207, 212-14,
217, 223-24, 226 (2d ed. 1998); See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 869-70 (summarizing the complex
relationship among media portrayals of crime, audience perceptions of it, and policymakers' use of it,
with a particular analysis of the role of appeals to fear).
248 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 8 ("National elected officials face a different set of
constituent pressures than local ones because of their geographic and electoral isolation from the
problem and, I suggest, because this isolation allows for the emergence of single-issue groups with
narrow interests whose problem definitions and issue frames intersect with prosecutors and police
around punishing offenders.").
249 See id. at 61, 73-75.
250 See infra text accompanying notes 255-57 (discussing the communities from which the
anti-incarceration groups come); see generally OWEN FIss, A WAY OUT: AMERICA'S GHETTOS AND
THE LEGACY OF RACISM 3-4 (2003) (describing life in these communities).
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expertise that the larger groups have.251 They are prompted to action by the pain
that both crime and crime-fighting techniques bring to their lives. 25 2 They have no
lobbyists, little money for travel or hiring lawyers, and are often skeptical of
formal governmental processes.253 Moreover, their experience teaches them that
crime is a multi-faceted problem that requires multi-faceted solutions.254
Abandoned homes shelter crack addicts while darkened streets do the same for
dealers; poor schooling leaves too many children without hope of decent
employment, thus making them vulnerable to being lured into crime; aggressive
and unfair police tactics produce community distrust that hampers police access to
the citizens who can help in solving crimes; and poverty makes for small, crowded
living quarters that drive bored youth onto the street, where trouble awaits them.255
These problems are shared by the entire community, uniting them in their
fear, and many of the offenders are the children, siblings, friends, and
acquaintances of the law-abiding.25 6 These groups, therefore, tend not to demand
specific policies, but rather affordable housing, accountable and talented teachers,
responsive and caring police, and job programs as part of the solution to crime and
a failing criminal justice system.257 The overwhelming nature of these demands
discourages legislator attention, for politicians find it hard to craft solutions that
they can even claim to achieve short-term results from which they can reap
258
political rewards. Moreover, broad citizens' groups do not come armed with
251 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 69.
252 See id at 160-63, 170-71 (citizens' groups are less punitive, more focused on harm-
reduction, angry at police abuses, yet desirous of greater police presence, more concerned with
prevention, redistributing physical safety, and crime's root causes).
253 See id at 103.
254 See id. at 174 ("They advocate for more police, but in the context of cleaner
neighborhoods, more opportunities, and better schools, which requires a reallocation of power and
resources. As the issue migrates to other legislative venues, the police message resonates, but much
of the rest is left behind.").
255 See id. at 152-56 (discussing neighborhood quality of life/crime connection), id at 171
(stating "housing, blight, police-community relations, economic development, education, and
services"). See also ANDREw E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 78-79 (2006) (explaining the link between aggressive policing
strategies and rising crime, combined with low capture rates); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth
Amendment In the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 167-68 (2002) (explaining connection between the housing quality of the
poor and their greater presence on the streets).
256 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 159-60 (quoting a Philadelphia legislator: "I think in the
African American community, the minority community, the Latino community, there're [sic] many
parents whose kids are having these problems and they're not really advocating them being locked
up"); id. at 173 ("But at the local level, where the damage of crime is felt in personal, familial, and
community terms, such a coupling [of victims' needs with harsher punishment] is much more
tenuous.").
257 See id at 107-09.
258 Id. at 108 ("Broad citizen groups bring to legislators a set of problems with depth and
breadth that have few simple policy solutions. The convergence of citizen organizations interested in
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259
specific proposals, draft legislation, or author expertly-written position papers.
These oversights can irritate legislators who complain that citizens' groups do not
know what they want and offer little help in the practical task of legislating.260
Cultural differences complicate matters, as middle-class legislators defer to busy
prosecutors or police chiefs, putting them on early in hearings so that they can get
back to the task of protecting the community. Meanwhile, citizen representatives
often are relegated to speak during the little time remaining at the end of the
hearing-ignoring the speakers' need to catch buses home, for many cannot afford
cars, and to drive home early enough to pick children up from school or placate
irate employers grudging about giving the speakers time off to pursue their
"personal business." 26' The result, explains Miller, is that broad citizens' groups
"make up a tiny fraction of the 'interested parties,' a miniscule portion of witnesses
at hearings, and an almost imperceptible percentage of personal contacts with
legislators" at the state and federal levels.262 Further magnifying the problem,
most of these broad groups consist of poor urban minorities in which legislators
from farm country, small towns, and white middle-class neighborhoods often have
little interest. 263
2. Who Gets Heard by Local Legislatures
Once the state- and federal-level dynamics are understood, it takes far less
space to explain this point: the urban poor do much better at being heard by local
legislatures than higher-level ones. Crime can dominate the lives of the poor. The
law-abiding are fearful, lose what money they have to thieves, take insufficient
advantage of services that may be offered at night, face medical expenses they can
ill afford, and suffer community disruption that makes political organizing
difficult.264 Nevertheless, they can elect city council representatives who live in
quality-of-life concerns and a legislative process that seems most amenable to policy-oriented groups
results in a highly restrictive venue for these broader groups.").
259 Id. at 107-08.
260 See id at 107.
261 See id. at 111-12; cf Fiss, supra note 250, at 28-31 (arguing that the de facto geographic,
economic, and political isolation of the residents of America's ghettos is so intractable as to require
but one solution: giving residents vouchers enabling them to leave).
262 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 103.
263 Id. at 112. One Democratic Pennsylvania Senator bemoaned this emotional and cultural
distance between most state-level legislators and the urban poor:
The more you get away from where it [crime] begins, the more you're talking about [just]
a bad guy that has committed a crime....What are we going to do? Without knowing or
caring whether he has a family, who's supporting him, what ties he has to the community
or she has to the community. And you don't care how he got there. It's too bad, it's too
late.
Id.
264 See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights are Wrong: The Paradox of
Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 13-14
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the same neighborhoods and are motivated to fight for similar interests. 265
Furthermore, they are geographically close to city hall should they wish to pursue
formal means of being heard.266 However, they also have at their disposal an array
of relatively cheap informal means: protests, vigils, strikes, ad hoc rallies, and
unexpected visits to legislators' offices. 267 Moreover, crime is so prevalent in the
neighborhoods that spawn these groups that the groups seek broad, long- and
short-term solutions, rather than the relatively narrow ones offered by more
organized groups.268 Police are often seen as part of the problem and bring with
them a history of policing as a symbol of racial oppression.269
Local legislators may be limited in what they can do, but they thus find it
impossible to ignore entirely the constant local public pressure for action to
regulate the police and to improve the problems of crime and the criminal justice
system. 270 Indeed, local councilmen are often far better versed about a range of
(Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999) (making similar point, though over-estimating racial
minority political power); Cathy J. Cohen & Michael C. Dawson, Neighborhood Poverty and African
American Politics, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 286 (1993) (arguing that traditional types of political
activity, such as voting, giving money to candidates, and volunteering in partisan political
organizations are much diminished in severely impoverished neighborhoods relative to more affluent
ones).
265 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 125-26, 135-36. For background on the socio-political
histories of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, see generally Peter C. Buffum & Rita Sagi, Philadelphia:
Politics of Reform and Retreat, in CRIME IN CITY POLITICs (Anne Heinz, Herbert Jacob & Robert L.
Lineberry eds., 1983) (documenting the history, corruption, and reform of Philadelphia's government
between 1948-1978); Matthew J. Countryman, From Protest to Politics: Community Control and
Black Independent Politics in Philadelphia, 1965-1984, 32 J. URB. HIsT. 813 (2006) (tracking the
history of independent black electoral activism within Philadelphia in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing
specifically on the Black Power movement); SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE CITY: Civic ENGAGEMENT AND
Civic LIFE IN PHILADELPHIA (Richardson Dilworth ed., 2006) (addressing the development of
"community" and the political and intellectual role of social capitalism within a community);
BARBARA FERMAN, CHALLENGING THE GROWTH MACHINE: NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS IN CHICAGO AND
PITTSBURGH (1996) (contrasting the different levels of success between urban growth policies in
Pittsburgh and Chicago).
266 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 176-79.
267 Id. at 128-29, 137-38.
268 See id at 148; Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with
the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221, 224-48 (2003) (summarizing
the efforts of poor, racial minority community members in Cincinnati to achieve longer-term, more
comprehensive solutions to the problem of alleged police abuses in that city).
269 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 124-25, 162-64.
270 See id. at 24-25, 133-38, 144-46. A Pennsylvania House Democratic representative
understood well the local dynamic:
Local officials are living in those communities, they're confronted by community leaders
who can't make it to Harrisburg, saying, "If we did this, clean up this neighborhood. .. ."
It's more real and pragmatic and more visceral at the local level. Those local officials
don't leave their place of work and go off somewhere else. They're there all the time.
Id at 112.
2011] 169
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
criminal justice issues than their state and federal counterparts. 271 These local
legislators are also very familiar with the local citizens' groups-sometimes a
dizzying array of them-and their informal actions and protests.272 One result is
that broad citizens' groups also represent large percentages of the witnesses
testifying at local legislative hearings, meet regularly with local police officials,
and share ideas and information with them.273 They engage in more formal action
too, including lobbying, while using threats to go to the media as an effective tool
to get councilmen to come to neighborhood meetings, and to do so with an
attentive ear.2 7 4
Correspondingly, local criminal justice agencies thus see local government as
hostile to the agencies' criminal justice interests.275 They recognize that the real
power over the criminal justice system is held by higher levels of government, so
they concentrate their resources at these levels.27 6 By doing so, they can promote
legislation to preempt local reform measures while blocking more comprehensive
solutions to criminal justice problems.277 None of this is to suggest that city
councils are controlled by urban racial minorities, for local officials have many
other groups to whom they must answer, and many material and political obstacles
which they must navigate. 278 But, in terms of criminal justice policy, poor racial
minorities tend to have a much greater and more effective voice at the lower levels
of government than the higher ones.279
Cognitive psychologist Michael Wenzel and his colleagues have done
research on when people prefer retributive responses aimed at punishing rule-
violators versus restorative responses aimed at repairing harms done. Their work
271 See id. at 135-38.
272 See id. at 143-46.
273 See id at 128.
274 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 137-38.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 231-45, at 40-42.
276 Local criminal justice agencies are often so busy just doing their jobs-responding to crime
and addressing internal organizational issues-that they lack the resources to devote full-time staff to
local lobbying. MILLER, supra note 227, at 143. Police will, of course, attend City Council hearings
when invited by Councilmen and will on certain issues occasionally initiate Council contact. Id at
141-42. But the more common local pattern is "relatively quiescent police advocacy" on criminal
justice policy. Id. at 142. Police apparently see state legislators as both more receptive to law
enforcement positions on such policy issues and more able to garner the resources for action, for it is
at the state level at which police aim their limited political resources. See supra text accompanying
notes 231-45.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 231-45.
278 See MILLER, supra note 227, at 144.
279 See id. at 156 ("Such intense citizen pressures can hardly be ignored by local lawmakers.").
Said one Pittsburgh City Council member: "There is more to worry about from grassroots [at the
local level] because they can really hurt you at the polls." Id
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further helps in understanding the different policy-orientations of local, multi-issue
groups (restorative in orientation) and of more punitive political forces.280
Retributive responses are unilateral, seeking punishment of the offender in
proportion to the harm he has done. 281 Such responses are coercive, requiring
neither the offender's agreement to the punishment nor his intellectual or
emotional acceptance of its wisdom.282 Restorative justice responses, by contrast,
seek to heal the victim, the offender, and the community. 283 Restorative justice
processes require the offender's agreement to participate and to accept certain
consequences.284 Moreover, such processes aim to make the offender accept that
he has done harm, to take responsibility for it, and to express sincere remorse.285
Retribution aims at unilateral, external censure, while restoration ultimately seeks
collective choice and offender self-censure.2 86 While retributive responses seek to
disempower the offender, thus degrading him in the way that he degraded his
victim, restorative responses seek to empower both offender and community by
bringing the offender's values and actions in line with community norms. 287
Retribution thus views the harm of crime as a status insult, while restoration views
the harm as a breach in the collective community.288 Different harms require
different cures: insult-for-insult versus communal embrace. 289 Restorative justice
thus, unlike its retributive cousin, aims at achieving a dialogue of mutual respect
280 See generally Michael Wenzel et al., Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 375 (2008) (addressing the effect retributive and restorative justice have on criminal
behavior).
281 See id. at 378 (emphasizing unilateral nature of retributive justice); Andrew E. Taslitz, The
Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law's Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, I U. MD.
L. J. ON RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLAss 306, 334-37 (2001) [hereinafter Taslitz, Civil Society]
(emphasizing proportionality requirements of retributive justice).
282 See Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 378.
283 Id. at 376, 378.
284 id
285 Id. at 378.
286 Id. at 379-80.
287 See id at 381-83 (concerning restorative responses); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 (1988) (noting that moral injuries are experienced as insults
that degrade us); Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 281, at 320-24, 335-39 (noting in turn that society
seeks retribution by proportionately degrading the offender).
288 See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 281, at 320-24 (concerning retribution as a response
to a status insult); Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 380-81 (restorative justice as seeking to heal the
communal harms of crime); Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW 42 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000) ("An offense is a threat to
community consensus about the correctness-that is, the moral nature-of the rule and hence the
values that bind social groups together.").
289 See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 281, at 335-38 (summarizing Evil-For-Evil
argument); Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 381-84 (noting restorative justice aims at restoring the
offender as an equal member of the political-moral community who reaffirms the group values that
he previously breached).
1712011]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
and equal voice, with the goal of healing the victim, the offender, and the
community.290 Restoration does not ignore punishment, which may be necessary
for healing, but rather seeks different forms and goals of punishment than does
retribution.2 9 ' Restoration is also concerned with more than punishment, with cure
as well as pain.292
Wenzel and his colleagues' work revealed that the choice of response-
retributive or restorative-is strongly related to the nature of inter-group status
competition.293 Individuals partly define themselves by their group connections.294
Observers may associate victim and offender with different social groups, with
"self and non-self," so that one's gain is the other's loss.295 Healing, by contrast,
assumes similarity: the offender and victim as wounded parts of a single social
body seeking restored health. Indeed, Wenzel posits that what benefits one part of
the body benefits another and the social organism as a whole.296 Accordingly,
when parties lack a common identity they are more likely to see rule transgressions
as insults to status, 297 eliciting a retributive response. 298 When they share a
common identity, they are instead more likely to see such transgressions as
challenges to shared values, eliciting a healing response. 299 Social distance thus
promotes retributive punishment, and social closeness tends to lead to restorative
justice remedies.
Granted, persons having a sense of belonging to two distinct groups may
share a sense of membership in a common, higher-order group; for example, those
with differing religious views still being "Americans."300 But two processes can
make differences prevail over similarities. First, there can be a "functional
antagonism" between two groups; particularly where the victim's group sees itself
as holding values relevant to the situation that are different from the offender's
290 See Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 381, 383-84.
291 See supra text accompanying notes 281-90.
292 See WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THEORY OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE 114, 117 (1992) (discussing restorative justice as healing); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, REPAIR:
THE IMPULSE To RESTORE IN A FRAGILE WORLD 52 (2003) (similar); supra text accompanying notes
281-90.
293 Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 383.
294 See TASLITZ, CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 13, at 134-35.
295 Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 383.
296 id.
297 Id at 382-84.
298 id
299 id
3 See id. at 384; S. L. GAERTNER & J. F. DovIDio, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 49 (2000); John C. Turner, A Self-Categorization Theory, in
REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION THEORY (A. Hagg, P. Oakes, S.D.
Reicher & M.S. Wetherell eds., 1987).
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group.'o Second, the victim's group might view its values as more "representative
and normative of the inclusive group generally." 302 Consequently, the offender's
group becomes defined as "deviant or subversive."3 o3 Racial minority status has
repeatedly been shown, at least at the subconscious level, to trigger a physical fear
of those belonging to other races. 30 The minority race's members thus come to be
linked by the majority to crime.305 A spate of empirical studies demonstrate this
phenomenon: from judges meting out harsher sentences to offenders with "Afro-
centric features," to police using more aggressive interrogation techniques with
black suspects than white ones,306 to employers evaluating black applicants with
minor criminal records more negatively than identically-situated white
applicants.307 Residential and educational segregation heighten the sense of
difference, thereby minimizing opportunities for members of different groups to
get to know one another well enough as individuals to trigger individualized-
assessments and a sense of group commonality over stereotypical assessments and
group division.3 08
This combination of factors again suggests that giving local urban racial
communities in heavily-policed areas more of an "effective" voice in state and
federal legislatures-a voice prompting serious deliberation and having the
prospect of altering criminal justice policy-should serve as an anti-incarceration
counter-force. 309 That, in turn, should moderate, or perhaps even help reverse, the
growth of the mass-incarceration state.
D. Democratic Social Science
Social science concerning how individuals and groups make sentencing-
related judgments in specific cases adds further support to the argument that wider-
spread PDD, especially concerning the criminal justice system, would discourage
mass incarceration. For example, for decades the public perceived crime rates to
301 See Wenzel et a]., supra note 280, at 384 (making similar point); Michael C. Hogg, Social
Identity and Group Cohesiveness, in REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION
THEORY, supra note 300, at 112 (first articulating the "functional antagonism" idea).
302 Wenzel et al., supra note 280, at 385.
303 id
3" See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the
Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 125 (2006) [hereinafter Taslitz, Wrongly Accused]; Andrew E.
Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: The Informants
Example, 37 Sw. U.L. REV. 1091 (2008) [hereinafter Wrongly AccusedRedux].
305 See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 304, at 126-28; Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux,
supra note 304, at 1099-1108, 1112-16, 1118-19.
306 See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 304, at 130-33.
307 See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 64-72 (2007); Taslitz, Wrongly AccusedRedux, supra note 304, at 1102-07.
308 See Bell, supra note 214 (residential segregation).
309 See TASLITZ, CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 13, at 138-39.
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be rising when, in fact, they were falling.310 Similarly, the public overestimates the
proportion of all crime consisting of violence: believing that abolition of the death
penalty raises homicide rates, even though cross-country data suggests the
opposite; overestimating the likelihood of a suspect committing crime while on
bail and of a convicted person's recidivating; and wrongly assuming that clear
"profiles" exist for certain kinds of offenders. 31' Yet, these conclusions are based
on surveys requiring quick responses, without respondents' engaging in careful
study of the issues. 312 Moreover, the generalizations made by respondents seem to
stem from the public's passive acceptance of media and politician-driven images
of the nature and extent of crime. 313 Those images have likewise led the public to
believe that judges impose unduly lenient sentences, despite the ever-harsher
nature of sentences via mandatory minimum legislation, sentencing guidelines,
moral panics, and a host of other mechanisms.3 14 These mistaken impressions
have fostered a public attitude in which most people worry more about what they
perceive to be excessive restraints on law enforcement than about denials of due
process or violations of sentencing proportionality principles.315
Yet, when ordinary persons are confronted with vignettes asking them to
make sentencing judgments in specific cases, their sentencing judgments are far
less harsh.3 16 Even though they are not dealing with real people face-to-face, or
hearing testimony conveying rich narratives, confronting subjects with the
specifics that occur in real cases moves them further from what their gut-reaction
generalizations revealed in surveys about criminal justice would suggest.317 Even
victims of certain real crimes likewise display leniency in specific cases.
Concerning the latter point, a 1982 study of burglary victims found them favoring
310 JUuAN V. ROBERTS & MICHAEL J. HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES To
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10-13 (2005); Humphrey Taylor, How Hard It is to Communicate Good News,
Harris Poll 34 (Wed. June 2, 1999), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-
Interactive-Poll-Research-HOW-HARD-IT-IS-TO-COMMUNICATE-GOOD-NEWS-1999-06.pdf
" ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 12.
312 Id. at 12-15, 23.
313 Id at 10-11, 17-18.
314 See id; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 860-87 (discussing moral panics).
315 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 14-15.
316 See id. at 21-22. The results of vignette studies reported in this section hold across
English-speaking countries (citing David Indermaur, Perceptions of Crime Seriousness and
Sentencing: A Comparison of Court Practice and the Perceptions of a Sample of the Public and
Judges, REPORT TO THE CRIMINOLOGY RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY
(1990)).
317 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 21-22; see generally Jennifer Cumberland &
Edward Zamble, General and Specific Measures of Attitudes toward Early Release of Criminal
Offenders, 24 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 442 (1992) (Can.) (describing the differences in global attitude
toward the release of criminal offenders); Edward Zamble & Kerry Lee Kalm, General and Specific
Measures ofPublic Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 22 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCi. 327, 328 (1990).
3 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 22.
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harsh penalties for burglaries in general, but non-custodial penalties for "their"
burglar.319
Many more studies, however, have used vignettes or other methods for
conveying case-specificity without turning to real victims.320 These more abstract
(abstracted from the experience of actually being victimized) studies yielded
similar results.321 In a 1992 study, for example, respondents expressed support for
denying parole to violent or serious offenders. 322 Yet, four-fifths of the subjects
given specific burglar parole applications favored granting them.323 More than half
the subjects reviewing aggravated assault and robbery convicts' files likewise
favored putting them on parole.324 When asked about initial sentencing of newly-
convicted offenders, rather than potential parolees, numerous studies yield similar
results: harsh attitudes in the abstract, lenience for particular individuals.325
Results like this suggest that the specificity of seemingly real cases and the
associated more-intense, more-informed concentration on those cases triggers
well-considered justice judgments that readily deviate from the criminal justice
narratives conveyed by media and politicians.3 26
Other sorts of polls reveal some reasons why they differ from judgments in
specific cases. Most polls impose on respondents a "forced choice" among pre-
selected options.327 Polls using follow-up questions can reveal subtler attitudes.328
For example, most Americans in polls express broad support for the death
penalty. 329 Yet, polls with follow-up questions reveal that the support for capital
punishment is limited to a few extreme cases-truly the worst-of-the-worst. 330
Other follow-up polls reveal that, when answering survey questions, the images
319 MIKE MAGUIRE & TREVOR BENNETT, BURGLARY IN A DWELLING: THE OFFENCE, THE
OFFENDER AND THE VICTIM 139, 141, 170 (1982).
320 See ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 21; Cumberland & Zamble, supra note 317, at
445; Zamble & Kahm, supra note 317, at 328.
321 Id
322 See ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 21; Cumberland & Zamble, supra note 317, at
445.
323 See Cumberland & Zamble, supra note 317, at Table 1.
324 See id
325 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 22; Zamble & Kalm, supra note 317, at 335; see
also Indermaur, supra note 316, at 46.
ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 21-25; John Hagan, Gabrielle Ferrales, &
Guillermina Jasso, How Law Rules: Torture, Terror, and the Normative Judgments of Iraqi Judges,
42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 605, 615 (2008) (using the "factorial survey method," described as the
'methodological gold standard' for the study of social norms in decision-making situations ...
including judgments about crime and punishment," a method involving "[v]ignettes, or scenarios ...
followed by questions that elicit normative judgments-in this study, about sentence length.").
327 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 20.
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popping into people's minds are of serious, violent, repeat offenders.33 1 Specific
case facts confront subjects with very different sorts of offenders.332 Even
relatively serious cases seem less straightforward in light of the complexity of
detail similar to that found in real life.333 More time to think and more information
to ponder softens retributive impulses.334 Indeed, such information also softens
responsibility judgments as respondents realize that many of the factors
contributing to crime are not fully within the offender's control.3 As one
commentator summarized the research, "When people are told about an offender's
history of childhood abuse, for example, their desire for severe punishment
diminishes."336
Deliberative polling further supports these conclusions. Deliberative polls
start with a survey of public attitudes on certain issues.337 But, respondents next
participate in a weekend seminar.338 Researchers measure attitudes at the start and
end of the seminar.3 3 9  The seminar itself involves respondents listening to
presentations on the issues.340  Participants can then deliberate before
responding. 34' Because participants constitute a representative sample, their
conclusions can more readily be generalized than would be true of other fully or
partly qualitative methods.342
Deliberative polls done about criminal justice issues inform respondents about
the many alternatives to incarceration, correct mistaken information in media
reports, and provide ample new information about the criminal justice system.343
331 Id. at 23-24; Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Public Punitiveness and Public
Knowledge of the Facts: Some Canadian Surveys, in PUBLIC ArtlTUDES TO SENTENCING: SURVEY
FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 111 (Nigel Walker & Mike Hough eds., 1988).
332 See supra text accompanying notes 320-26.
33 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 24.
336 id.
3 See id. at 25; see generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009) (offering a detailed defense of deliberative polling
against its critics, relying both on empirical data and political theory); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS ET AL.,
TALKING TOGETHER: PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 5 (2009).
338 ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 25.
340 Id
341 id.
342 FISHKIN, supra note 337, at 25 ("Deliberative Polling.. .was developed explicitly to
combine random sampling with deliberation."). The conclusions of deliberative polls can either be
reported to enter into the "actual public dialogue, or, in some cases, the actual policy process." Id.
343 See FISHKIN, supra note 337, at 32-43; ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 25; Loretta J.
Stalans, Measuring Attitudes to Sentencing and Sentencing Goals, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PUNISHMENT OF CRIME 231, 241-42 (Margit E. Oswald, Steffen Bieneck & Jdrg Hupfeld-Heinemann
eds., 2009).
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Participants break up into smaller groups for discussion, debate, and deliberation,
after which respondents are again interviewed.3 " Providing new information and
encouraging participants to then engage in sustained thought about its
consequences promotes more careful, systematic analysis.345 Furthermore, as
much research demonstrates, persons who know that they will be held accountable
for their views, even if only in the sense of reporting them to others, become
"flexible balanced thinkers who actively entertain counterarguments from
conflicting sides."346  Accountability reduces reliance on emotions and prior
attitudes or values in favor of more careful information processing.347 Indeed,
although angry, unaccountable subjects give more severe sentences than calm
ones, research has demonstrated that initially angry, accountable subjects move
348
much of the way toward the greater leniency of the calmer participants.
Unfortunately, the expense and time-consumption involved in deliberative
polling has meant that few have been done in the area of criminal justice
severity.349 Moreover, those that have been done have relied on general questions
rather than incorporating detailed case summaries. 35 0 Nevertheless, those that have
been done reveal a move toward rehabilitative sentencing strategies and away from
harsher prison sentences.s3 5  The most well-known such deliberative poll indeed
found,
[T]hat respondents had shifted their attitudes away from a punitive stance
immediately after the event and were less supportive of the use of prison
for young offenders and believed that prison was a less effective option;
moreover, this shift remained 10 months after the deliberative poll,
352
suggesting that the attitude change was enduring.
34 See FISHKIN, supra note 337, at 38-40; ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 25; Stalans,
supra note 343, at 242.
345 See FISHKIN, supra note 337, at ch.2; Stalans, supra note 343, at 242.
346 See Stalans, supra note 343, at 243 (quoting Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of
Responsibility, 24 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 563, 563-74 (1998)).
347 Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg, & Philip E. Tetlock, Sober Second Thoughts: The
Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributes of Responsibility, 24 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 563, 564 (1998); see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are
People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized
Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 52-53 (2010) (summarizing empirical data on
the virtues of explanation and accountability in reducing cognitive errors).
348 See Lerner et al., supra note 347.
349 See ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 25.
3s0 See Stalans, supra note 343, at 242.
35 See id. at 244; Mike Hough & Alison Park, How Malleable Are Attitudes to Crime and
Punishment? Findings from a British Deliberative Poll, in CHANGING ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT:
PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 163 (Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough eds., 2002).
352 Stalans, supra note 343, at 242.
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In addition to adding support to the idea that PDD lowers reliance on
incarceration as a sentence, this data suggests another route for expanding
democracy in the realm of criminal justice: incorporate vignettes and deliberative
polling results into public policy decisions. These results provide a better picture
of informed, reasoned popular attitudes than do most surveys. It may be
impractical routinely to incorporate PDD into everyday policymaking. But relying
on social science of certain kinds mimics much of real-world PDD, thus
introducing a PDD element into the decision-making process. Granted, much
more social science of this kind is needed in the criminal justice area.
Nevertheless, social science can thus itself render criminal justice policymaking
more democratic, and, in the process, less punitive.
E. Happiness Research
Empirical research on what makes humans happy has recently exploded. 53
Although there is lively debate about how to define and measure happiness, none
of that debate needs to be reviewed here because it would not alter my
conclusions. 354 Happiness research reveals support for the conclusion, with little to
challenge it, that aspects of PDD promote human happiness. Human happiness in
turn reduces criminality, thus reducing the supposed justification for harsh criminal
justice policies.3 5 5 Increased happiness should also reduce some of the emotional
need to strike back at perceived threats to safety by means of severe sentences of
incarceration.35 6
Government that promotes voice and accountability, is effective, promotes the
rule of law, and minimizes corruption is an important happiness-promoter.357
Voice and accountability are particularly relevant here and refer to the "degree to
which citizens participate in choosing their government and the degree of freedom
accorded to speech, association, and media expression."358 Rule of law concerns
include police and court effectiveness and the degree to which officials abide by
society's rules.35 9 In the United States, those rules especially include muscular
35 See generally DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN
FROM THE NEw RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING (2010) (outlining the historical study of happiness and
new developments of current research); ARTHUR C. BROOKs, GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS: WHY
HAPPINESS MATTERS FOR AMERICA-AND How WE CAN GET MORE OF IT (2008) (discussing why
some Americans are happier than others).
354 See BOK, supra note 353, at 9-10, 41-42.
35s See infra text accompanying notes 357-412.
356 Id.
3 See BOK, supra note 353, at 23, 181.




personal freedom guarantees.360 Trust in public officials, particularly the police, is
maximized when they adhere to procedural and other guarantees of personal
freedom and treat persons subject to their authority with dignity.36 ' Police and
other public agencies', including courts', responsiveness to citizen demands
matter, and increased citizen voice is interpreted as an expression of respect.362
Equality values also play a role. "According to a World Values study,"
explains former Harvard University President Derek Bok, "tolerance of minority
groups-whether defined by race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation-is
likewise associated with greater happiness, not merely for the groups directly
affected but for the entire population."3 6 3 It is not income equality that matters so
much as status equality.3 6 Extreme status inequality, including that conveyed by
inequality of imprisonment, violation of constitutional rights, and irrational
attitudes undervaluing the accomplishments of salient social groups and their
365individual members, can do much to undermine happiness.
Political inequality is particularly troubling. The actual or perceived
inequality of access to political institutions is a form of voice-suppression, a
significant injury to happiness.36 6 Yet as voice-suppression snowballs, individuals
feeling excluded from the political process become still less likely to participate in
it because they see it as a sham.3 6 7  When government policies indeed reflect
exclusion of certain groups' perspectives, it feeds the perception and reality of
sham-like processes. 3 6 8 But exclusion also undermines individual and collective
well-being. As Derek Bok put it, "[a]lthough some people have more knowledge
of public affairs than others, political equality is now considered necessary because
360 Id. at 22-23.
361 See id. at 23, 181-82, 201-02. On trust's social significance more generally, see MAREK
KOHN, TRUST: SELF-INTEREST AND THE COMMON GOOD 8-16, 104-08, 124-33 (2008).
362 See BOK, supra note 353, at 23.
363 Id.; see Ronald Inglehart, et al., Development, Freedom, and Rising Happiness: A Global
Perspective (1981-2007), 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. Sci. 264, 271 (2008).
3 See e.g., Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Happiness Inequality in the United States, in
LAW AND HAPPINESS 33, 34-35, 56-74 (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010).
365 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 95-136 (documenting racial inequality in the distribution
of imprisonment and other law enforcement practices and in the protection of constitutional rights);
cf. BOK, supra note 353, at 94-95 (discussing happiness-diminishing effects of political inequality
and of inequality of opportunity); Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, Fairness and
Redistribution, 95 Am. ECON. REv. 960, 965 (2005) (concluding that "[p]eople enjoy great
satisfaction when they know (or believe) that they live in a just world, where hard work and good
behavior ultimately pay off").
3 See supra text accompanying notes 357-65 (analyzing the link among political inequality,
voice-suppression, and poverty in criminal justice legislation); infra text accompanying notes 370-82
(on voice suppression).
367 See BOK, supra note 353, at 90.
368 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Bullshitting the People: The Criminal Procedure Implications of a
Scatalogical Term, 39 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1383, 1395-98 (2007) (discussing emotional, moral, and
political costs of sham-like processes).
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no one, however well informed, can be trusted to fully understand the concerns of
others or to weigh their interests as perceptively and as sympathetically as those
directly affected by the government's policies."06 9
Voice-promoting procedures matter because of the "feedback information"
they convey to the self.370  Specifically, procedures address three core
psychological needs: autonomy, relatedness, and competence. 371  Autonomy
encompasses the experience of being causal, of being able to organize one's own
actions in an effort to affect the world.372 Relatedness includes the desire to
connect to others in relationships of care and to be treated as a respected member
of salient social groups.373 Competence concerns one's "predisposition to control
the environment and to experience oneself as capable and effective."374
Voice is therefore important because it promotes a sense of autonomy and
competence.375 To achieve this result, "effective voice" is required, that is, a voice
perceived as having the real prospect of at least sometimes changing outcomes.
Ineffective voice conveys the sense of empty ritual, of not really being "listened
to."3 7 7 Effective voice, on the other hand, addresses relatedness too because such
voice "is an important signal about one's standing in a group."378  Individuals
involved in arbitrations, mediations, civil or criminal trials, or other dispute
resolution mechanisms that give them a chance to speak their minds are far more
likely to accept negative outcomes as legitimate. 379 They are also far more likely
to respect and obey the law in the future.3 so On a broader scale, more democratic
institutions achieve similar results in the political realm because they enhance
individuals' perceptions of autonomy.381 Indeed, a number of studies, most
famously one involving Swiss cantons, suggest that the more opportunities
available for direct democratic participation in government and other institutions
affecting everyday life, the greater the levels of happiness.382
369 BOK, supra note 353, at 89.
370 See BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN EcoNOMICS 109 (2008).
372 id
374 FREY, supra note 370 (procedural justice meted out by relevant institutions also contributes
to a positive sense of self).
37s Id. at 110.
376 TASLITZ, CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 13, at 137-41.
37 FREY, supra note 370, at I10.
3 See id.
38o See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161-78 (1990).
381 See FREY, supra note 370, at 113-16.
382 Id. at 116-22 (also noting many later studies were redesigned to address criticisms of the
Swiss canton study).
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Institutions thus affect levels of happiness, and the law plays an important role
in shaping and reflecting those institutions. 3  Institutions can shape how
individuals interact and how they feel about their interactions.3 8 Institutions can
leave room for fair procedures to emerge at varying levels of daily life or block
them.3 8 5  Institutions affect not only individual happiness but the happiness of
salient social groups, broader communities, and perhaps even of nations.3 8 6
Voice and equality of voice promote happiness, which is a good in itself.
Surely a happier society, if consistent with other social goods, is a better society.
But happiness also may be anti-criminogenic.
For example, depression in youth promotes drug or alcohol usage, dropping
out of school, and "deficits in social functioning," all of which are risk factors for
criminal behavior.3 8 7 By contrast, happy people "get better performance reviews,
have more prestigious jobs, and earn higher salaries." 8 They are also "more
likely to get married and, once married, they are more satisfied with their
marriage." 3 8 9 Those who are happily married and working at well-paying jobs are
likewise less likely to turn to crime. 390
383 See id at 111 (addressing self-worth).
384 See id. at 111-12.
385 See id at 112-13.
386 See BOK, supra note 353, at 22-27; see FREY, supra note 370, at 61-68 (arguing that the
more potent causal arrow points to democracy's primarily causing happiness). Concerning causation,
at least one study has found that the causal arrow runs both ways: democracy contributes to
happiness, and happy people enhance democracy and improve government quality. This same study
found, however, that the "more potent" of the two effects was that happy people improve the quality
of their government. See CAROL GRAHAM, HAPPINESS AROUND THE WORLD: THE PARADOX OF HAPPY
PEASANTS AND MISERABLE MILLIONAIRES (2010).
387 CHRISTINE CARTER, RAISING HAPPINESS: 10 SIMPLE STEPS FOR MORE JOYFUL KIDS AND
HAPPIER PARENTS xii (2010). Christine Carter is the Executive Director of the University of
California Berkeley's Greater Good Science Center, which is devoted to "positive psychology," the
study of "what makes happy people happy, functional families functional[.]" Id. at x. See generally
Joanne Savage, Understanding Persistent Offending: Linking Developmental Psychology with
Research on the Criminal Career, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT CRIMINALITY 3, 13-14,28-32
(Joanne Savage ed., 2009) (noting link between these factors and persistent criminality); see also
Child Trend Databank, Adolescents Who Feel Sad or Hopeless (2010)
http://www.childrendsdatabank.org/sites/default/files/30_%2OFeltSador_Hopless.pdf (collecting
references and statistics about correlations and predictors of, and consequences of, youthful
depression).
388 CARTER, supra note 387, at xiii.
389 Id See generally BARBARA L. FREDRICKSON, POSITIVITY: GROUNDBREAKING RESEARCH
REVEALS How To EMBRACE THE HIDDEN STRENGTH OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS, OVERCOME NEGATIVITY,
AND THRIVE 131-32 (2009); ED DIENER & ROBERT BISWAS-DIENER, HAPPINESS: UNLOCKING THE
MYSTERIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WEALTH 55-57 (2008) (for scientifically-inforned summaries of the
benefits of personal happiness).
390 See Linda S. Pagani, The Influence ofFamily Context on the Development and Persistence
ofAntisocial Behavior, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT CRIMINALITY 37, 44 (Joanne Savage ed.,
2009) (marriage); Carter Hay & Walter Forrest, The Implications of Family Poverty for a Pattern of
Persistent Offending, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT CRIMINALITY 54, 55 (Joanne Savage ed.,
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Positive emotions lead to greater thinking flexibility and awareness of the big
picture while fostering emotional strength, more deeply-bonded friendships, and
greater ability to handle stress. 391 Emotionally resilient people with strong support
systems and ties to their communities shy away from crime.3 9 2
Parental depression harms children.393 The children of depressed parents act
out more, perform worse on tests, use less expressive language, and have weaker
social skills. 394  Their parents are less likely to constructively correct bad
behaviors, are less sensitive to their children's needs, and are less able to play with
them in positive ways.395 Parental unhappiness is also contagious; children's
emotions mimic those of their parents.396 Indeed, it is not only parents that matter,
but friends, neighbors, and siblings living in close proximity, whose greater
happiness or unhappiness will likewise reproduce itself in children.397 Sad, lonely
2009) (unemployment); Thomas G. Blomberg, et al., Educational Achievement Among Incarcerated
Youth: Post-Release Schooling, Employment, and Crime Desistance, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PERSISTENT CRIMINALITY 250, 251, 253-54, 261-63 (Joanne Savage ed., 2009) (unemployment).
391 See CARTER, supra note 387, at xiii-xiv; FREDRICKSON, supra note 389, at 126-27.
392 See Stephanie Ellis & Joanne Savage, Strain, Social Support, and Persistent Criminality, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT CRIMINALITY 76 (Joanne Savage ed., 2009) (noting that the
literature suggests that "social support" may strengthen social bonds and improve coping skills,
attenuating the effects of social strain, promoting psychological well-being, and thus reducing future
crime and delinquency, and finding further support for this conclusion in their own study).
3 See CARTER, supra note 387, at 5-6.
3 Id The leading research linking parental unhappiness to bad outcomes for children
includes Susan B. Campbell et al., Trajectories of Maternal Depressive Symptoms, Maternal
Sensitivity, and Children's Functioning at School Entry, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1202 (2007);
Xin Feng, Daniel S. Shaw & Jennifer S. Silk, Developmental Trajectories of Anxiety Symptoms
Among Boys Across Early and Middle Childhood, 117 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 32 (2008); Xin Feng,
et al., Emotional Exchange in Mother-Child Dyads: Stability, Mutual Influence, and Associations
with Maternal Depression and Child Problem Behavior, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 714 (2007); Karen L.
Franck & Cheryl Buehler, A Family Process Model of Marital Hostility, Parental Depressive Affect,
and Early Adolescent Problem Behavior: The Roles of Triangulation and Parental Warmth, 21 J.
FAMILY PSYCHOL. 614, 614 (2007); Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Depression Among Moms:
Prevalence, Predictors, and Acting Out Among Third Grade Children, CHILD TRENDS (March 2006)
http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/momdepressionrb.pdf
3 See CARTER, supra note 387, at 5.
396 Id. at 6. See generally Andrew N. Meltzoff, Imitation and Other Minds: The "Like Me"
Hypothesis, in PERSPECTIVES ON IMITATION: FROM NEUROSCIENCE To SOCIAL SCIENCE 55-77 (Susan
Hurley & Nick Chater eds., 2005) (discussing children's emotions mimicking those of their parents);
Cameron Anderson, Dacher Keltner & Oliver P. John, Emotional Convergence Between People over
Time, 84 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1054 (2003) (noting also that the less powerful
person in a relationship mimics the emotions of the more powerful). Compare Ferran Casas et al.,
Does Subjective Well-Being Show a Relationship Between Parents and Their Children?, 9 J. OF
HAPPINESS STUDIES 197 (2008); with Bill E. Peterson, Generativity and Successful Parenting: An
Analysis of Young Adult Outcomes, 74 J. PERSONALITY 847 (2006) (arguing that happy parents lead
children to mimic that happiness).
3 CARTER, supra note 387, at 6-7; James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Dynamic
Spread of Happiness in a Large Social Network: Longitudinal Analysis Over 20 Years in the
Framingham Heart Study, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 2338, 2344 (2008) (documenting how the probability of
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children, parents, friends, and neighbors make for low self-esteem, anger,
defeatism, eating and sleeping disorders, and the quest to find quick, often illegal,
*398
solutions to life's pain. Poor social relationships also have ill consequences
from an early age, as one psychologist explains:
Children consistently rejected by their peers have more problems; for
example, they are more likely to get in trouble with the law, do poorly in
school, or have psychiatric problems as adults. But kids who develop
strong relationships and are socially intelligent-as emotional
intelligence guru Daniel Goleman calls it-tend to flourish.
Avoiding criminal activity also requires skills in conflict resolution, which in
turn requires empathy.400 Kids who cannot take other viewpoints into account will
not settle disputes well.401 Positive conflict resolution boosts school performance,
self-confidence, and self-esteem, while promoting creative problem-solving.402
Ineffective conflict resolution, on the other hand, has the opposite effect, often
ending in violence.403
Happier, more empathetic people also tend toward generosity and kindness,
behaviors that again strengthen bonds with others and even improve physical
health and longevity.404 But helping others, rather than hurting them, itself further
increases positive emotions and self-worth. 405  Generosity "reduces adolescent
depression" and "several studies have shown that teenagers who volunteer are less
likely to fail a subject in school, get pregnant, or abuse substances."406 Forgiving
people also heightens happiness, while persons who are routinely unforgiving
"can't seem to stop plotting revenge or ruminating about how they've been
happiness among those living in close proximity or otherwise closely connected rises when one of
their number is happy).
3 See CARTER, supra note 387, at 21.
3 Id at 22.
400 Id. at 26-27 (linking good conflict resolution to empathy).
401 Id. at 26-27.
402 Id. at 27.
403 CARTER, supra note 387, at 26.
404 See id. at 30-31; STEPHEN POST & JILL NEIMARK, WHY GOOD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD
PEOPLE 7-10 (2007) (discussing the kindness-health connection); Stephen G. Post, Altruism,
Happiness, and Health: It's Good to be Good, 12 INT'L J. BEHAV. MED. 66 (2005).
405 See CARTER, supra note 387, at 31-32. The causal connection between happiness and
kindness is thus apparently bi-directional: happiness breeds kindness and kindness breeds happiness.
See id.
406 Id. at 31. See also Peter L. Benson, E. Gil Clary & Peter C. Scales, Altruism and Health: Is
There a Link During Adolescence?, in ALTRUISM AND HEALTH: PERSPECTIVES FROM EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH 97-115 (Stephen G. Post ed., 2007) (noting the link between generosity and depression-
reduction).
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wronged."407 Such hostility promotes still more conflict, further amplifying anger
and anxiety.408 On the other hand, forgiving promotes empathy, with all its
attendant benefits.409
In short, PDD would at least contribute to higher levels of happiness, which
should in turn help to drive down crime. Lower crime does not necessarily
translate into lower perceptions of crime. 4 10  But, as discussed earlier, PDD
processes should reduce the citizenry's emotional commitment to harsh
punishments like incarceration, and logic suggests that greater societal happiness
should likewise soften retributive impulses. That softening due to higher
happiness levels should occur, in part, because of happiness's empathy-promoting
qualities. This is because empathy is a prerequisite to compassion, which in turn
fosters the impulse to mitigate punishment.4 11 Moreover, PDD processes should
improve the citizenry's knowledge base, perhaps bringing perceptions about crime
closer to reality. In such an environment, additional declines in the crime rate
might serve as an effective rhetorical tool for arguing against the continued
national obsession with incarceration.4 12
IV. CONCLUSION
Numerous criticisms have been raised of PDD-fears that it is ultimately
elitist, that it will be controlled by slanted presentations, that high-status members
will dominate discussions, and that brutal antagonism is a good and unavoidable
thing for democracy-being just a few of the common complaints.413 I do not have
the space to address those criticisms here but note only that I think that recent
research decisively answers each of these objections, and I refer skeptical readers
to those sources. 414 On the other hand, though I think PDD a politically desirable
407 CARTER, supra note 387, at 71.
40 See id. at 71-72.
401 See id at 7 1.
410 See ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 10-15.
411 See Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 186, at 441 (2009).
412 The uncoupling of actual crime rates from criminal justice policy-that is, rising mass
incarceration in a time of declining crime rates-is likely due in part to the public's misperception
about the true crime rate. See ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 310, at 153-60. If that is so, then
bringing perceptions into line with reality should soften political support for incarceration as the form
of punishment, arguably therefore later leading to actual changes in criminal justice policy.
Criminologists Julian V. Roberts and Michael J. Hough interpret a variety of experimental
evidence-showing greater, more accurate, and more balanced information as softening retributive
impulses-to support just such a strategy. See id
413 These concerns were all raised in the roundtable held in connection with this symposium
[Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies].
414 See generally LAWRENCE R. JACOBS ET AL., TALKING TOGETHER: PUBLIC DELIBERATION
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (2009) (articulating empirical and theoretical responses to
the critiques of deliberative democracy); FISHKIN, supra note 337 (2009) (similar).
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contributor to sound governance, my narrower task here has been to present
evidence that PDD-like processes can contribute to moderating or reversing the
American obsession with mass incarceration. Note that I said contribute. I make
no reductionist claim that there is a single explanation for the current state of
affairs. Nor do I claim that in a single article I have made a decisive case. Indeed,
some readers may see alternative explanations to some of the phenomena that I
report or find any one piece of evidence interesting but not overwhelming. I have
drawn, however, on multiple data sources and theories. My argument is that these
converging evidence sources build a more-than-plausible case for PDD's carceral-
restraining power.
Remember too that PDD is an ideal to which real-world institutions may
aspire without likely ever achieving full realization. PDD can also manifest itself
in numerous ways. Accordingly, the evidence on which I have drawn includes
processes that sometimes embody only certain aspects of the ideal. Even given
this qualification, however, I believe that the evidence underscores the value of
two underlying anti-carceral forces: (1) improved use of criminal justice expertise;
and (2) the promotion of empathy for excluded groups and marginalized persons.
A. Expertise
Many writers laud deference to criminal justice expertise as essential to
moderating mass incarceration.415 It is the politicization of criminal justice that
they believe furthers mass incarceration.416 If the experts were let alone to rule this
area of policy, all would be well. Populism is the problem, not the solution.417
Franklin Zimring and colleagues make this case forcefully, analogizing to the
Federal Reserve's role in economic policy. The authors maintain that the Federal
Reserve was created to be independent because of a form of democratic breakdown
specific to macroeconomic policy: the masses will push for policies that lead to
high inflation and excessively low interest rates, yet lack any understanding of the
complexity of the issues, resulting in harsh boom-bust economic cycles.418
Independence of the central bank is needed not because democracy generally fails,
but because it fails in this policy instance.419 Zimring and his colleagues also
maintain that the same is so with criminal justice policy: the masses will, in their
ignorance and fear and because of manipulation by politicians, agitate for mass
415 See FRANKUN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 175-80 (1997).
416 See FRANKUN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YoU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 217-32 (2001).
417 See id.
418 Id. at 204-09.
419 See id. at 207-08.
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incarceration, thus causing unnecessary human suffering, doing little to lower
crime rates, and costing enormous and unnecessary sums of money.420
I agree with much of this analysis but would cast expertise in a different light.
PDD processes make use of experts in the relevant area-here, criminal justice-to
inform lay citizens in settings where they are more likely to listen and learn from
the experts. Properly administered, these settings offer various viewpoints and
seem to be effective in creating sharply improved lay-citizen understanding of
complex issues.4 21 Furthermore, decision-making requires accurate emotional, as
well as intellectual, information. 422 PDD-like processes can help lay people obtain
more informed understandings of their own affective and cognitive intuitions.
Even Zimring and his colleagues come close to conceding the point thus:
The tendency for members of the public to vote only their attitudes
toward criminals may be dependent on the citizen's role, as well as on
the way in which the issue is made into a choice. Turn a complaining
cab driver into a sentencing judge and his or her sensitivity to questions
of desert and proportionality in individual cases might be just as strong
as the judge sitting in the next courtroom. Because the questions voters
can decide are limited in form, we cannot know how much of the upward
bias is a product of the character of who is making the decision and how
much is a function of how the issue is presented.423
I disagree with this quote only to the extent that it is so tentative. Ample
research suggests that the cab driver and the judge converge under the right
circumstances.424 But if this is true, the case for a limited exception to general
principles of democratic rule in criminal justice fails because several of the
propositions justifying such an exception weaken-namely the bias and ignorance
of the people in a complex area.
My other disagreement with the common wisdom about criminal justice
expertise is that it favors elite rule in this policy area without explaining how to get
the political support for such rule in a democracy. The more direct, non-inclusive,
winner-take-all, raw-populist forms of American government, for example, at least
next to many of the Western European Continental governments, create incentives
for politicians to manipulate the people by distorting criminal justice policy for
420 See id. at 207-09. Explain the authors, "The lesson here for criminal justice reform is the
importance of a commitment and respect for expertise, which is itself a justifying ideology for the
insulated delegation of punishment power." Id. at 209.
421 See supra text accompanying notes 337-52.
422 See supra text accompanying notes 316-36 (discussing research showing that giving
experimental subjects rich narratives, including filling them with case-specific facts, or studying real
crime victims judging real offenders significantly moderated the subjects' and victims' punitive zeal).
423 See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 416, at 202.
424 See supra text accompanying notes 316-36.
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political gain.425 American politicians have proven quite adept in this task. Even
in states like New York, where political elites rule relatively insulated from many
direct populist pressures, the politicians still seek "tough-on-crime" poses as a way
of getting votes. 426 These politicians may give true criminal justice experts more
of a voice than in other, more directly populist, states. This moderates mass
incarceration somewhat, but the politicization of criminal justice policy still reigns,
just to a somewhat lesser degree.427 The case I have tried to argue for here is that
more PDD-like policies should do an even better job of encouraging deference to
criminal justice experts. Deliberative citizens apparently become informed enough
about criminal justice problems to allay their baseless fears. Moreover,
deliberation likely increases their willingness to consider alternatives and to see the
wisdom in deferring to experts. At a minimum, deliberation seemingly causes the
political grip of politician-manipulated crime fears to fade sufficiently so that the
politicians no longer see a benefit in raw-populist policies, preferring to let the
experts rule to a greater degree.428
But at what point have PDD practices sufficiently pervaded the polity to
contribute significantly to the end of raw-populist rule? More importantly, radical
changes in American government to promote pervasive PDD, particularly in the
criminal justice area, would require a mass movement that I can see nowhere on
the horizon. The best we can hope for is to expand PDD wherever small
opportunities present themselves or to encourage more local PDD revolutions at
the level of the neighborhood, the city, and, with any luck, more individual states.
That practical political limitation is one reason that PDD is likely to contribute
only modestly in the near future to change. But the difficulty of the task makes it
no less desirable.
One final comment about my own expertise. I am making a descriptive
claim: that PDD can contribute to moderating or reversing the obsession with mass
incarceration. I have assumed that that is a good thing, but others may not agree,
and I have not and cannot in this paper defend that claim. At the roundtable held
in connection with this symposium, one colleague asked me whether I would
support PDD if, it in fact, led to more mass incarceration. I hesitated because it is
a counterfactual, and I would be guessing about how that state of affairs might
affect my own views. My response was that I would still favor PDD on different
grounds not addressed here-on grounds of political theory. But I would
unquestionably view that result as a high cost to promote other democratic values.
Yet there is also good reason to believe that that potential conflict between my
personal policy preference to reduce mass incarceration and PDD achieving the
opposite is highly unlikely to occur because of something that I value highly in a
425 See supra text accompanying notes 180-226.
426 See supra text accompanying notes 62-95.
427 See supra text accompanying notes 30-95.
428 See supra text accompanying notes 96-144.
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just society and that is integral to sound deliberation: specifically, the promotion of
empathy.
B. Empathy-Promotion
Empathy is the ability to stand in another person's shoes-to see and feel the
world through that other's eyes. 429 Empathy is not the same thing as sympathy or
compassion. You might not like what you see and feel, thus having no desire to
aid the other person. 430 But empathy is an essential first step in understanding the
other, and empathy often has numerous benefits, particularly political ones.43'
True deliberation cannot occur without cognitive and emotional open-mindedness
to others' views and a willingness to view them with respect.432 Correspondingly,
PDD-like processes help to promote empathy itself.433
One of the dangers inherent in certain deliberative processes is that of group
polarization-the like-minded getting more extreme in their views upon hearing
each other echoing them.434 Another danger is that those with strongly-held views
who see them losing in the deliberative process will just shut down, participating
no further and closing their minds.435 Yet the chief polarization-worrier in legal
academia, Cass Sunstein, agrees that PDD versions of deliberation, more
436
specifically the deliberative poll, are unlikely to be dogged by polarization.
Such polls are also unlikely to face loser-rejection of the process. 437 Sunstein
attributes this to these features of deliberative polling: participants discuss and
offer opinions but do not vote (thus, no losers); they listen to a balanced panel of
experts; moderators play a key role in promoting civility and equal floor time; and
participants receive a set of balanced materials. 3 8
A deeper understanding of why the polarization and loser-resistance
phenomena can be minimized or cured by PDD, however, comes from
understanding some of the underlying psychological processes and how empathy
addresses them. Two related processes are the fundamental attribution error and
429 See Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 186, at 431-41.
430 See id. at 420.
431 See id
432 See MICHAEL E. MORRELL, EMPATHY AND DEMOCRACY: FEELING, THINKING, AND
DELIBERATION 104 (2010); infra text accompanying notes 435-60.
433 See infra text accompanying notes 435-60.
434 See Taslitz, Deliberation, supra note 10, at 3 11.
435 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 120.
436 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 188, 193-95
(2002).
437 Id.; MORRELL, supra note 432, at 118-26.
438 Sunstein, supra note 436, at 194 (similar but adding one more factor); David Schkade et al.,
What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 935 (2007) (dropping the additional
factor earlier recognized by Sunstein).
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the actor/observer bias. 439  The fundamental attribution error is the tendency to
attribute others' motives and behavior to their character rather than the situation in
which they find themselves.40o The actor/observer bias is the tendency of actors to
attribute their successful behavior to their own character and their unsuccessful
behavior to the situation, while observers conclude that character alone explains
others' behavior.4 ' For example, a student doing well on a test attributes her
success to her intelligence and hard work. The same student who fails the test
blames it on the unfair instructor or the noisy neighbor who interfered with the
student's studying. On the other hand, a student seeing a colleague fail the test
attributes the failure to the colleague's stupidity or laziness.
In the political realm, a similar process results in the tendency to attribute
relatively negative emotions to others whose attitudinal positions differ from their
own.44 2  The more a person cares about an issue, the stronger that person's
tendency to attribute ill, probably selfish, motives to opponents." 3 Such distrust is
inconsistent with respectful, open-minded discussion, attitude change, or
compromise.4" Moreover, where the actor/observer bias is strong in one person
but not another, the two will differ in their interpretation of the facts." 5 Thus, a
wealthy businessman who climbed his way up the economic ladder might attribute
his success to his natural talent and hard work, and the failure of the poor to do
better to their slothfulness, if this is an issue about which he feels strongly. A
poorer person might explain his relative deprivation based on poor neighborhood
schools and the need at an early age to care for a sick mother. He might also
explain the businessman's success by the latter's utter ruthlessness." 6 When the
two sides cannot even agree on the basic facts, and distrust one another to boot,
real conversation is unlikely." 7  Furthermore, each side is likely to credit only
those who already agree with their views, thus promoting polarization.
439 See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 304, at 126 (discussing fundamental attribution
error); see also Robert Gould & Harold Sigall, The Effects of Empathy and Outcome on Attribution:
An Examination of the Divergent-Perspectives Hypothesis, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 480
(1977) (also discussing actor-observer bias).
440 See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 304, at 126.
4' See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 102-03.
442 Glenn D. Reeder et al., On Attributing Negative Motives to Others Who Disagree with Our
Opinions, 31 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1498, 1507 (2005).
44 See id. at 1508; see also MORRELL, supra note 432, at 104-05.
44 See also MORRELL, supra note 432, at 104-05 ("If [deliberative] interlocutors ... attribute
unethical and strategic motives to those with whom they disagree, one can hardly imagine how it
would be possible for them to give each other equal consideration, reach any sort of mutual
understanding, or be able to reciprocally address validity claims.").
44' See id. at 104.
446 Id. at 105 (using analogous examples).
47 Id.
448 CASS R. SUNsTEIN, WHY GROUPS Go To EXTREMES 10-16 (2008) (explaining the causes of
group polarization); Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts'Fear of the Subconscious in
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Empathy, however, can overcome both the inability to see the other's view of
the facts and the distrust of the other. It does this because the very definition of
empathy is the ability to see and feel the world through another's eyes.449 Empathy
can be promoted in at least two ways: imagination and experience. 45 0  Ample
empirical data attests to the success of these methods in fostering empathy. 451
Thus, observers in experiments who were asked to role-play by observing a
target with the goal of discerning the target's true thoughts and feelings reduced
actor/observer bias significantly relative to instructions only to discern the target's
thoughts or only to observe carefully period.452 Other experimental data reveals
that actors "see themselves [and persons close to them]... as versatile, complex,
and multifaceted; they do not see one specific trait as being dominant in any given
behavior.' 53 Yet, they see others as simpler, thus being more willing to judge
those others based upon stereotypes or presumed traits.454 But "[t]he empirical
evidence supports the hypothesis that instructing people to be sensitive to others'
thoughts and feelings will increase the probability that they will come to see others
as more multifaceted and complex, and because of this, be less biased in their
attributional [sic] judgments.'A55
Research on bias against out-groups supports similar conclusions.4 56 Role-
playing instructions are effective in reducing such bias. Indeed, role-playing
instructions are quite more effective at bias-reduction than are simple instructions
to avoid out-group bias.45 7 Furthermore, role-playing decreases stereotyping and
increases positive out-group evaluations. Other research found similar results
when participants read first-hand accounts of discrimination. 58 Such accounts
improved empathy, opening minds and hearts. Other empathy experiments found
even more positive attitudes toward convicted murderers and drug users as a class,
Date Rape (and Other) Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 171 (2007) (defining the "confirmation
bias" or tendency to seek out or only pay attention to data and arguments that already support your
pre-existing views).
44 See Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 186, at 420, 431-41.
450 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 106-18; Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 186, 431-41.
451 See infra text accompanying notes 451-60.
452 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 107; Valerie Melburg, et al., A Reexamination of the
Empathic Observers Paradigm for the Study of Divergent Attributions, 124 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 201,
204 (1984).
453 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 108.
454 See id
455 id.
456 See id. at 109-15.
457 See id. at 109-11.
458 See id. at 112 (summarizing the research); Krystina A. Finlay & Walter G. Stephan,
Improving Intergroup Relations: The Effects of Empathy on Racial Attitudes, 30 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1720 (2000) (using first-hand accounts).
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once perspective-taking instructions were given.459 In the case of the drug users,
greater empathy led to greater willingness to help drug users as a class.460 Indeed,
the data suggests that perspective-taking instructions or first-hand accounts about
individual members of a group can foster an enduring change in attitudes toward
other members of the group, softening negative feelings and increasing positive
ones.461
Empathy thus aids useful deliberation, but deliberation can itself promote
empathy. Thus, in prisoners' dilemma games, players are "more likely to
cooperate if there is some communication between them prior to engaging in the
game.'A 62  Explains political scientist Michael E. Morrell, "this gives indirect
evidence that empathizing may importantly influence the way people approach
conflict situations.' 6  But the empathy was itself induced by the prior contact.4
More direct evidence comes from experiments by C. Daniel Batson and Tecia
Moran, who found that role-playing instructions encouraging altruism raised the
likelihood of cooperation in both a business frame and a social frame version of the
prisoners' dilemma, though cooperation was greater in the social frame than the
business frame. 465  Another study concluded that similar instructions raised
cooperation even for targets who had previously defected.466 In both studies, the
participants themselves attributed their behavior to increased empathy.467 A well-
designed PDD process is indeed targeted to promote the imaginative and
experiential tools to foster empathy, and Morrell argues that much more attention
must be explicitly devoted to this design feature for PDD to succeed. 468 Face-to-
face deliberation, the use of written stories and film, conversation designed
459 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at I 10-11; C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and Attitudes:
Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?, 72 J.
PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. 105, 116 (1997) (murderers); C. Daniel Batson,et al., Empathy,
Attitudes, and Action: Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Motivate One to Help the
Group?, 28 PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1656, 1663 (2002) [hereinafter Batson, Empathy]
(drug users).
460 See Batson, Empathy, supra note 459, at 1663.
461 See MORRELL, supra note 432, atl 10-l1.
462 Id. at 115. See generally John M. Orbell, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt & Robyn M. Dawes,
Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. 811 (1988)
(addressing how discussion between subjects affects the prisoner's dilemma).
463 MORRELL, supra note 432, at 115.
464 See id
" See id. at 115-16 & n.6 (summarizing the research) See generally C. Daniel Batson &
Techia Moran, Empathy-Induced Altruism in a Prisoners' Dilemma, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 909
(1999) (studying these frames).
466 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 115-16; C. Daniel Batson & Nadia Ahmad, Empathy-
Induced Altruism in a Prisoner's Dilemma II: What if the Target of Empathy Has Defected?, 31 EUR.
J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 25, 34 (2001).
467 See MORRELL, supra note 432, at 115-16.
468 See id. at 116-8.
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specifically to encourage cognitive and affective sharing, and role-playing
instructions are ways to foster these outcomes. 469 Experimental research dealing
specifically with deliberative contexts indeed reveals that empathy promotes open-
mindedness and the perception of its occurring even among deliberative
"losers." 470 Empathy also increased everyone's enjoyment of the process, and both
the enjoyment and the open-mindedness make it more likely that even potential
losers will continue in serious deliberation.47 1 Contrary to some earlier studies,
there is also evidence that empathy-promoting deliberation raises political
participation of the now-more-informed participants as well.472
PDD at its best thus works in part by promoting more complex, less-
stereotyped, more individualized, more concrete, more empathetic judgments
about other relevant individuals and groups. But those sorts of judgments are
precisely the kinds that lead to more creative solutions to problems, softer
assessments of others' perceived wrongs, and greater willingness to understand
their life situation. That PDD about criminal justice issues promotes less punitive,
or at least less mass-incarceration-obsessed, policy is thus no accident.
Empathy also helps to answer concerns about the role of race. Many readers
will justifiably see mass incarceration as primarily reflective of racial and class
biases, at least unconscious and institutional ones.473 But the research suggests that
empathy-inducing PDD-like processes will reduce racial bias and actions
stemming from it.474 That arguably should likewise reduce the political appeal of
46 See id. at 118.
470 Id. at 125-26.
471 See id.
472 See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY (James H.
Kuklinski et al. eds., 2002) (arguing that, under most circumstances, people prefer a political system
that they can trust but largely stay uninvolved in); MORRELL, supra note 432, at 184-86
(summarizing Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's work, and that of social scientists reaching similar
conclusions, on this point); FisHKIN, supra note 337 (summarizing more recent data contradicting the
Hibbing/Theiss-Morse thesis); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 337 (similar); MORRELL, supra note 432, at
186-87 (arguing that empathy-emphasizing PDD structures widely adopted will encourage direct
participation rather than discourage it). A related question is whether PDD should aim only to
advise, or should it result in some final vote or consensus product that includes a product which
actually creates public policy. A policy-determining decision would be more likely to produce group
polarization for the reasons noted above, but some authors see ways to compensate for the problem,
one such author indeed recommending a new PDD-like branch of government. ETHAN LEIB,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
(2004). Here I will say only that it is best and most realistic to start small (advisory), continue real-
world experimentation, but think big (hoping for a more PDD-expansive policy future).
473 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1.
474 See FisHKIN, supra note 337 (summarizing evidence that, overall, PDD done properly helps
to overcome status inequalities); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 337 (similar); BARKER, supra note 24, at
18-19, 55, 62, 76, 178-79 (arguing that states that do a better job of incorporating Blacks into the
political process, especially into a more PDD-like one, have lower incarceration rates); Taslitz,
Tinkerbell, supra note 186, at 433-35 (processes that increase empathy reduce racial bias and vice-
versa).
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race-bias-manipulation to politicians. PDD and race-bias-reduction are thus
interactive. While PDD seems independently to discourage mass incarceration, in
the particular context of the United States and its history of slavery, Jim Crow, and
other forms of racism, PDD may also work indirectly to reduce political support
for widespread incarceration by reducing the sense of racial threat that partly
underlies it.
C. A Final Word
PDD's connection to attitudes toward mass incarceration and toward
punishment more generally merits further investigation. The practical, political,
and cultural obstacles to widespread PDD adoption in the United States are
daunting. But daunting and impossible are not the same thing, and little victories
matter. Political change often comes slowly, over the course of decades, perhaps
never at all. But denouncing the wasteland before us changes nothing. One must
first know what seeds to plant, what crops to grow. PDD holds promise as one
tool for a more fruitful criminal justice future.

